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Abstract
In his book Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts, Timothy
Sisk has argued that “What is most important is not whether ethnic group identity is innate and
fixed or contrived and manipulable; it is that members of an ethnic group perceive the ethnic
group to be real. Perceptions are critical in understanding the extent to which intergroup relations
can be peaceful or violent” (Timothy Sisk, 1996, p. 13).
In South Sudan, "Identity Groups" are not only perceived to be real, they are real, and as
such serve as the basis ethnic differentiation. Before the separation and independence of South
Sudan in 2011, Sudan was inhabited by over five hundred distinct ethnic groups; South Sudan
seceded with sixty-four of these ethnic groups. Importantly, each of these groups had unique
cultures, traditions and religious beliefs that shaped their identities. This multi-ethnic and multicommunal setting created an environment conducive to social conflict, in that it set the stage for
the absence of a unified Sudanese identity. The result was "protracted civil conflict" (Azar,
1990), resulting in decades of political instability and civil wars. First, there were two post
(1956) independence civil wars with the North, and second, following its independence in 2011,
a civil war broke out within South Sudan. The net result is that since independence in 1956, these
civil wars totalled thirty-nine years of conflict that killed over three million and three hundred
thousand people on both sides, mostly from South Sudan – totals not to be envied.
This paper initially seeks to trace the origins of identity groups in Sudanese/South
Sudanese history, both before and after the Turko-Egyptian and Anglo-Egyptian condominium
eras beginning in 1821 and lasting until 1956. Further, it will trace the continuing impact of
colonial and independent Sudanese government policies on creating "isolated identities" as the
"root causes" of the protracted social conflict seen in Sudan following independence in 1956.
Finally, through the author's first-hand experience growing up in South Sudan, the paper
explores how these identity groups have been perpetuated into the present through an
examination of the socialization process. In conclusion, the paper will document how a lack of a
common shared identity created dysfunction in South Sudan's Transition Government, resulting
in instability, insecurity and widespread human suffering.
iv
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Introduction

Once the largest country in Africa, inhabited by 40,661,000 people before the session of South
Sudan in 2011 (World Bank, 2014), Sudan has been engaged in civil wars almost continuously
since its independence in 1956. The question addressed in this major research paper is whether
Sudan’s civil wars, described by many historians and political scientists as intractable conflicts
that have been ongoing since the Turko-Egyptian and Anglo Egyptian colonial eras began in
1821, can be explained by using Edward Azar’s theory of “Protracted Social Conflict” (PSC). It
is argued that Sudan’s bi-polar character (a northern region under Egyptian-Arab influence and
southern region under African influence, combined with a multi-communal reality in both
regions, which was exacerbated by the colonial legacy of “Divide and Rule” policies, produced a
unique political culture in the country that failed to embrace anywhere near what may be seen as
a unified national identity. Unfortunately, with the coming of independence in 1956, the
Republic of Sudan followed the same pattern of governance characteristic of the prior colonial
regime, and attempted to manipulate group identities to promote its policies of “Arabization” and
“Islamization,” which favoured the north. Specifically, the paper argues that the current crisis in
South Sudan can be seen as the continuation of the communal political conflict that was inherited
from Sudan, and was exacerbated by the absence of a unified political identity necessary to
address South Sudanese issues collectively and peacefully as one nation.
Sudan’s thirty-nine years of civil war have drawn particular attention to the need to
study and understand why this culturally rich country was engulfed in such devastating wars,
both before and after South Sudan’s separation and independence. Further, why did South
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Sudan’s separation and independence in 2011, a strategy widely seen to be a solution to so-called
“intractable conflicts,” fail so badly in bringing peace and stability to the newly minted country?
In so doing, Chapter One establishes the relevance of Azar’s Protracted Social Conflict
theory, which cites the fundamental importance of communal identities to countries such as
Sudan and South Sudan and their problems in achieving peaceful governance. It argues that
Sudan is, without doubt, a textbook example (perhaps the textbook example) of Azar’s theory of
protracted social conflict at work.
In Chapter Two, the paper will first discuss the pre-colonial composition of ethnic groups
in South Sudan and how these groups interacted historically. Secondly, it will review the way in
which the unique colonial system established under the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium,
exacerbated Sudan’s tribal divisions by favouring some over others, thus initiating a set of
lasting grievances.
Chapter Three explores the unique circumstances of the British withdrawal from Sudan,
leading to independence in 1956; the new state’s role following independence, documenting the
impact of the first of Sudan’s civil wars (which actually began prior to independence); as well as
explaining the Addis Ababa Agreement, which in 1973, ended that war. It argues that the state
continued to operate under the colonial model, further entrenching tribalism and regional
inequality through the way in which services and resources were distributed to the indigenous
African Sudanese and other ethnic groups of Arab origin. In addition to the preconditions for
conflict identified by Azar, regional disparities between North and South were not addressed and
was an influential factors in creating conditions leading to continued inter-communal violence.
Chapter Four deals with abrogation of the Addis Ababa peace agreement following ten
years of relative peace, plus the attempted imposition of Islamic hegemony on the South – all of
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which culminated in a second civil war, even more devastating than the first. The chapter ends
with a discussion of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), which in 2005 ended the
second civil war. That Agreement called for a six-year period, following which there would be a
referendum in the South, whereby voters would decide whether to remain a part of a United
Sudan or separate and form an independent state of their own. The results of that referendum
were that 99 percent of South Sudanese voted in favour of independence, which was achieved in
2011. Within two years, South Sudan was again at war, this time within itself.
In Chapter 5, the paper will explore the role of various “socialization agents” in
maintaining “isolated identity groups.” This will be done through an examination of the personal
experiences of the author, who grew up and lived in South Sudan from 1959 to 1984. While the
chapter focuses mainly on one tribal socialization experience (among sixty-four different
ethnicities in South Sudan), it will be used to demonstrate how socialization acted to shape
individual ethnic identities in ways that did not promote a “national identity.”
In the conclusion, the paper will review the question of how an independent South Sudan,
widely promoted as a solution to Sudan’s continuing civil wars, became caught up in the same
set of circumstances that have bedeviled the nation from the time of independence. The paper
will end with an assessment of whether, given the lack of a cohesive national identity, “state
failure” and “protracted social conflict” are permanent conditions for South Sudan.
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Chapter One
“Identity Groups and Azar’s Theory of Protracted Social Conflict”
Unfortunately, since the beginning of creation, political differences, communal conflicts, and
civil wars have been common phenomena among human beings. When an armed conflict
(whether interstate or intrastate) begins, it is most often the case that there will be an end to that
conflict—either a negotiated solution is reached, or one side emerges victorious. However, in
Sudan, the thirty-nine years of civil wars since independence in 1956 is an exception – the
country has experienced an almost unparalleled prolonged catastrophe that has claimed millions
of lives (Sidahmed & Soderlund, 2008, p. 84), widened national identity differences and still
shows few signs of ending. Despite the gravity of the conflict, the world’s press and the
academic community were mostly silent about Sudan.1 This was the case until the latter half of
the 1990s, when many asylum seekers and groups of refugees from both Sudan and South Sudan
started migrating to neighbouring countries, with some going to new homes across the oceans. At
that point, the global community, including some academics, became aware of the civil war in
Sudan and started critical searches for answers to explain the on-going carnage.
Among the explanations that emerged for Sudan’s conflicts, we argue that Edward Azar
has offered a theory of “Protracted Social Conflict” (1990) that appears well-suited to
understanding the prolonged civil wars in Sudan. Although the theory was not rooted in the
Sudanese experience, the independent variables offered by Azar as conditions leading to
communal conflicts are without a doubt critical to understanding the lengthy and seemingly
intractable civil wars in Sudan. These four variables, communal identities, the role of the state,
basic human needs, and international linkages, explain to a remarkable degree, not only the
4

factors underlying the prolonged civil war in Sudan, but why, after apparently finding a solution
to the North/South Sudan conflict in the form of separation and independence in 2011, another
civil war broke out, this time in the newly-independent Republic of South Sudan. This chapter
will objectively examine the contribution of each of these factors to the Sudan/South Sudan case
to establish the relevance of Azar’s theory in explaining the causes of Sudan’s persistent and
violent communal conflicts.
The Importance of “Communal Identities”
In his theory, Azar points to “communal identity” as perhaps the most significant factor
triggering protracted social conflict. He defined a community as a “politicized group whose
members share ethnic, religious, linguistic or other cultural identity characteristics” (Azar, 1990,
p. 5). In this context, it is essential to point out that Sudan has over five hundred different ethnic
groups and that each of these ethnicities has formed its unique identity-- beyond geography,
there was little that unified them.
Azar argued that “multi-communal societies, whether formed as a result of divide-andrule policies of former colonial powers or through historical rivalries, often produced political
systems characterized by the dominance of one group over the others, which he described as
leading to the “disarticulation between the state and society as a whole” (1990, p. 5). We found
that the first of these variables, identity group formation (as a precondition for the protracted
social conflict in Sudan and South Sudan), began in the centuries before colonization (see
Johnson, 2003, pp. 3-4; Deng, 1995, p. 35; Dhurgon, 1995). That process of basic ethnic group
formation set the stage for what was to follow.
Azar then identified two factors that could lead to the rise of politically active identity
groups in multi-communal societies. Among these are the historical rivalries which developed in
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the context of Sudan’s prolonged conflict between the North and South Sudan. For example, the
Nuba and Fur in Western Sudan identified themselves as “African” instead of the predominant
“Arab” North. Another factor are the divide-and-rule policies enacted by former colonial
powers, such as Britain’s declaration of the “Closed Border Ordinance” that restricted northern
access to South Sudan (see Johnson, 2003, p. 11).
Tracing the process by which colonial policies strengthened pre-colonial ethnic identities
(as well as “national policies” of successor state governments following the Independence of
Sudan), we rely heavily on Douglas H. Johnson’s The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars
(2003). The primary motivation behind British policies to establish different administrations and
separate development strategies for the northern and southern Sudan is unclear. Some see it as
cultural protection for the South, arguing that the British intention was to safeguard and protect
the naïve South from the policies of “Arabization” and “Islamization” thrust upon it by the
North, while, at the same time, empowering Christian missionaries to promote the Christian faith
and provide education. However, some scholars saw the Closed Borders colonial policy’s
intention as the early recognition that Southern Sudan’s future might ultimately lie with the
countries of British East Africa, rather than with the Middle East (Johnson, 2003, p.11). For
example, Abdel Rahim argues that “the basic considerations that dictated the Southern policy
were the colonial interests of the British Empire in Sudan and East Africa” (Rahim, 1966, p.
227). Further, the British colonial policy has been described as a diabolical system that
strengthened colonial control by increasing friction among what might have been “one country’s
people” (Johnson, 2003; Koul & Logan, 2019).
Regardless of the motivation (we believe both were involved), Johnson convincingly
argues that the British policies of “divide and rule” as practiced in Sudan are unique in colonial
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administration annals. First, they set up essentially different governance systems for the two
parts of Sudan; thus, from the start, more or less guaranteeing that it would be unlikely that
Sudan would develop into a single political entity. The South’s administration was constructed
along ‘African.’ rather than ‘Arab’ lines, discouraging (and later actually prohibiting) northern
cultural and economic intrusion into the South. Simultaneously, the British implemented a
loosely administered system of “native administration” in the South, built heavily around ethnic
culture and customary laws, thus enhancing and strengthening local identities at the expense of a
southern-wide identity. Thus, whether intended or not, British colonial policy worked against the
development of both pan-Sudanese and pan-South Sudanese identities. The importance of this
for future developments cannot be overstated.
State Institutions (and Power) Captured by One Group
Azar explains that in countries facing and experiencing protracted social conflict, political power
becomes dominated by one identity group; that group then uses its power to allocate resources
unequally in favour of its ethnicity. Furthermore, they use their power to ensure that they remain
in control of the state. Any attempts made by the disadvantaged communal group(s) to
participate in governance are brutally repudiated (such as evidenced in the current conflict in
South Sudan Conflict), resulting in a prolonged social conflict (Azar, 1990, p. 7).
The competition for power and influence among rival identity groups happened in Sudan
under colonial rule and, importantly, continued after Independence in 1956, when political power
became concentrated in the North, at the South’s expense. A political system rooted in power
imbalances between identity groups carried over as well into the new state of South Sudan
following its Independence in 2011. In both situations, the state became dominated by a single
communal group (or a coalition of a few ethnic groups) which monopolized benefits for their
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own, while marginalizing the majority of smaller ethnic groups. Following independence in
1956, subsequent northern-dominated governments downgraded and ignored other groups’
interests and needs, not only in the South but also in Eastern Sudan, Western Sudan, and some
Northern Sudan areas (see Deng, 1995). Azar points out that efforts to resolve such power
disparities by enforcing assimilation and integration policies (such as attempted by the northerndominated Sudanese Government in Eastern Sudan (the Bejja), Darfur and the Nuba in the West
and the Blue Nile) impede the nation-building process (Azar 1990, p. 7). Such policies damaged
the social fabric and contributed to protracted social conflict in South Sudan.
Countries suffering from Protracted Social Conflict will often see minority groups’
attempts to participate in governance met with resistance and force by the dominant group. Azar
concludes that “such crises exacerbate the already existing conflictive situations, diminish the
states’ ability to meet basic needs, and lead to further developmental crises” (Azar, 1990, p. 7).
For example, as we shall see in the following chapter, a ‘promise’ by northern politicians to
consider a federal government system (a primary demand of the South at the time of
Independence) was subsequently ignored by a succession of northern-dominated governments.
This refusal to even consider a federal system led directly to two civil wars (1955 – 1972 and
1983 – 2005), and indirectly to the current conflict in South Sudan.
Deprivation of Human Needs
The meeting of basic human needs (such as food, shelter, and security) is crucial for individual
and communal survival. In today’s world of scarcity, especially in post-colonial countries, these
basic needs are seldom met satisfactorily, much less equally. All too often, privileged groups
benefit in abundance in the allocation these basic needs, while other groups are discriminated
against, thus initiating grievances. Grievances resulting from needs deprivation are usually
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expressed collectively, and the failure to rectify these grievances on the part of state authorities
leads to protracted social conflict (Azar 1990, p. 7). Azar also pointed out that basic needs do not
necessarily have to be thought of as primarily survival needs; they can also be psychological,
cultural, and infrastructural/developmental needs. He argued that such unmet basic needs do not
necessarily lead directly to conflict. However, what is critical is the degree to which, over time,
minority groups can gain access to political institutions to ensure the recognition of their
communal existence (Azar 1990, p. 9). Unequal distribution of benefits by the state deprives
non-favoured groups from receiving equal services and benefits in employment. For example, in
Sudan’s first post-colonial government, South Sudanese were given only four out of eight
hundred civil service positions (Deng, 1995, p. 25).
Furthermore, continuing during Sudanese government rule, remaining high on the list of
regions not well served by the Sudanese government was the South. Economically, provinces in
South Sudan did not receive benefits equal to Northern provinces. Such inequality alienated
South Sudanese and pushed them to rebel against the state. Annual transfers from the central
government in Khartoum to the South accounted for approximately 20% of Sudan’s total budget,
even though 95% of the South’s total tax revenues were transferred to the North. For example, in
1982, as reported by the Regional Ministry of Finance in South Sudan, the revenue collection
from different sectors was estimated to be 13 million Sudanese pounds. The annual budget
allocated for the three Southern provinces of Bahar Elgazal, Equatoria and Upper Nile in the
same year was estimated at 4 million Sudanese pounds. Moreover, in addition to receiving less
than other provinces, South Sudan’s payments tended to be paid behind schedule, meaning that
government employees in the South received their monthly salaries late.2
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Another area of deprivation can be seen in physical infrastructure and developmental
projects, which the central government in Khartoum controlled. It was not until 1960 (when
General Ibrahim Abboud took power through a coup d’état), that through his “Arabization” and
“Islamization” policies, most government buildings in the three provinces of South Sudan were
built. In each province, Abboud built three primary schools, two intermediate and one secondary
school. The building of these schools and other government facilities was not to carry out a
national infrastructural plan for the whole country. Rather, he intended to reinforce his
government’s policy of Arabization and Islamization in the South by controlling education from
the primary level to secondary schools. It is worth mentioning here that only missionary schools
were allowed to operate freely in the South during British rule. Teaching was based on the East
African Curriculum, comprised of courses in the English language, Christian religion and
mathematics. The few schools built by the central government admitted only muslim pupils.
International Linkages
On the fourth variable, Azar outlined two international linkage models described as
preconditions for social conflict. These models were “economic dependency” and “patron-client
relationships.” With the advent of globalization and competition in international trade,
disadvantaged and poor states were often forced to depend on global assistance (economically
and developmentally) to maintain and provide their citizens’ services. Such assistance was
derived from global economic and financial systems giants such as the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. These institutions imposed their influence on underdeveloped
countries by controlling their “economic development policies” and (partly or wholly) by
dictating their financial policies. There are many questions about who benefits from these
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policies, and Azar stressed that dependence on foreign economic systems often exacerbates
denial of communal groups’ access to basic needs (Azar, 2005, p. 11).
Patron-client relationships refer to arrangements whereby a wealthier state guarantees a
weak state’s security in return for loyalty and various concessions. In that client states’ loyalty
involves obedience to the more robust states’ desires, this relationship may significantly and
negatively impact the extent of a state’s ability to provide services to its citizens. Azar argued
that such dependency often exacerbates denial of communal groups’ access to basic needs,
distorting domestic political and economic systems by imposing numerous conditions involving
international capital, domestic capital, and the state (Azar, 1990, p. 11). In some cases, these
“conditionalities” may require the weaker state to give up vital sovereignty elements such as
autonomy, self-reliance, and possibly even independence. A state that gives up these domestic
rights and obligations may be forced to adopt foreign policies which run counter to its citizens’
needs. Moreover, giving up these liberty factors will impede economic development and likely
create resentment among citizens, which will ultimately breed grievances and eventually cause
social conflict.
Evidence of the impact of such patron-client relationships can be found in the civil wars
between the North and South: Saudi Arabia (under King Fahad) and Egypt (under Hosni
Mubarak) supported the North, while Libya (under Muammar Gaddafi) and Ethiopia (under
Mengistu Hailemariam) aided Southern fighters. For example, during the SPLA/M’s fight with
the North, Khartoum declared that the civil war being fought in the South was a “holy war,” its
objective was to protect Islam (and the South Sudanese Muslim) from being dominated by the
SPLA/M, which was mainly Christian and ideologically western-oriented. This declaration
prompted many Muslim and Arab countries, such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, to intervene to
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preserve the Islamic religion and culture and protect Arab identity in Sudan. Egypt sent military
advisors and air force units to fight against the rebels in South Sudan. Egypt did this under the
defence agreement Jaafar Numayri had signed with Hosni Mubarak under the pretext of
safeguarding and protecting the Nile watershed. On the other side, Libya aided the South
(SPLA/M) materially through military hardware and finances to earn African countries’ trust and
support in Gaddafi’s vision of creating the United States of Africa and reinforcing Pan
Africanism. In both cases, external interference worked to solidify already well-established
North/South identity differences.
This primary point of the chapter is to establish that all the four variables underpinning
Azar’s protracted social conflict theory, leading to Sudan’s protracted Civil Wars, can be found
in Sudan’s history, both before and during colonialism. Furthermore, we argue that these same
variables carried over into Sudan (both North and South), following independence in 1956 and
into South Sudan following its separation and independence in 2011. In the following chapter,
we will present the detailed evidence needed for understanding Sudan’s seemingly endless
conflict through the lens of Azar’s PCS theory.
Notes
1. Among ten severe humanitarian crises in the 1990s, Sudan has ranked 3rd in terms of
severity (measured by numbers killed and numbers of refugees), 10th (last) in terms of
media interest and 10th (again last) in terms of the strength of an international response
(Sidahmed and Soderlund (2008, pp. 84-88).
2. The author’s father worked for the Sudanese government, so I can attest first hand to the
lateness of salary payments.
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Chapter Two
Sudan: Complex Historical Legacies
Contemporary Sudan is mired in multiple conflicts whose origins can be traced to the distant,
pre-colonial past, which the highly atypical Anglo-Egyptian colonial experience (following after
an Turko-Egyptian occupation) built upon. Ruth Iyob and Gilbert M. Khadiagala, in their book
Sudan: The Elusive Quest for Peace, argued that Sudan's pre-colonial past includes an imperial
heritage linking it to the pharaonic civilization of the Nile valley, to the Christian kingdoms of
ancient Nubia and Merowe, and to the Islamic Nilotic Sultanates that emerged in the region's
central riverain areas (located along the River Nile) and Western Savanah lands (Iyob &
Khadiagala, 2006, p. 27). They further pointed out that the historical relations between the
rapacious central riverain sultanates and the South's territories bestowed a legacy of political
marginalization and socioeconomic inequalities contributing to the interlocking regional
conflicts that characterize today's Sudan. Generally, they argued that the conflicts that continue
to rage in the country are all manifestations of the continuing quest on the part of Sudan's
multiethnic inhabitants for a more equitable membership in Sudanese polity that recognizes the
worth of each and all within in it (Iyob & Khadiagala, 2006, p. 27).
The Pre-Colonial Setting
Centuries before the colonial era began with the invasion of Egyptians and the Turks in 1821,
Sudan existed as a group of scattered kingdoms. Spanning from Eastern to central Sudan was the
Funj kingdom; the Fur and the Nuba were located in Western Sudan (leading two separate
empires, concurrently in North and South Darfur and in North and South Kordofan); and the
Shilluk and Zande, also two autonomous kingdoms, were located in Southern Sudan. Other
13

Negriod Nilotic tribes existed along the Nile, such as the Dinka the Nuer and the Shilluk, who
lived inland, far to the South, and had very little to no mention in Sudan's ancient history.
Overall, the most prominent kingdom was that of the Kush (located adjacent to Egypt), during the
Pharaohronic period. History recalls that some of the Kushite kings had invaded and ruled parts of
Egypt. Sudanese historian Mekki Shibeika, in his book Sudan over Centuries, argued that between
the 5th and 6th centuries, marriages among Arab immigrants and the indigenous Sudanese are
considered the beginning of the Arab identity in ancient Sudan (Shibeika, 1956, p. 17).
According to Douglas H. Johnson, the ethnic groups located in current South Sudan did
not play a significant role in Sudan's ancient history, except for the "Shilluk" in Upper Nile
Province, who, according to LaVerle Berry, had attempted to advance north along the Nile. They
reached Aljazeera on the White Nile in the 17th century, but were repulsed by the Funj (Barry,
2015, p. 14; Johnson, 2003). The "Zandi" (located in Western Bahar Elgazal) were connected to
the Azande Kingdom situated in Central Africa. Other societies and groups existed in South
Sudan, such as the "Bantus," which consisted of the greater "Bari" Acholi, Avakian, Moru, along
with many other "hunter-gatherer" tribes located in what is now Equatoria Province. These
communities lived in isolated, well-organized and ethnically-governed settings. They shared no
common tribal/ethnic identity and were not united. It is argued that the absence of a sense of
nationhood and a non-existent unified government had facilitated and eased the outsiders'
invasion and conquest. Eventually, as a result, the country was subject to Turko-Egyptian rule
from 1821 to 1885.
Johnson has argued that Sudan's problems have been wrongfully explained and
attributed entirely to colonial policies. Moreover, the predominant interpretation of its
continuous conflict has focused too much attention on a bi-polar explanation -- an "Arab" north
14

versus "African" South. Consequently, scholars and other writers have seldom elaborated on the
multi-communal and the diverse identities of the 500+ ethnic groups in Sudan, which can be
argued to be the main factor underlying the country's protracted civil conflict. Johnson argues
that Sudan's historical and contemporary dysfunctional politics is based on identity issues that
can be traced beyond the well-recognized Arab vs. African split. Moreover, the roots of these
identity issues were established long before the advent of colonialism. However, as stated earlier
by Frances Deng and Riak Dhurgon, the arrival of the "invaders" failed to create a common
identity among the Sudanese tribes living in the South. Nevertheless, the conquest and
occupation did contribute immensely to changing the cultures, religious beliefs, and patterns of
daily living of the exposed indigenous peoples by forcing them to adapt and conform to their
new rulers' rules and other forms of exploitation.
Colonial Conquest and Occupation
Mekki Sheibeka, in his book Sudan Over Centuries emphasized extensively on the routes the
'Arab' communities took in the 5th and 6th centuries to enter Sudan and North Africa. He argued
that the collapse of the "Maarab" dam in Saudi Arabia necessitated the Arab exodus (along with
their livestock) looking for fresh drinking water and grazing land for their animals. Sheibeka
explained the two routes the Arabs took to enter Sudan – in the North East, over the Red Sea
from Saudi Arabia, in the North and northwest Africa, through the desert in a caravan from
Egypt (Shibeika, 1956, p. 17). Their settlement in the 'Land of the Sud' could be thought of as an
invasion, although it was not coercive (Shibeika, 1956, p. 20). The migrating Arabs, through
intermarriage with the locals, were able to establish many communities and expanded Arabic
culture and Islamic religion in the region.
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Turko-Egyptian Rule: The "Turkiyya" (1821-1885)
Riak Machar Dhurgon, in his article "South Sudan: A History of Political Domination,"
examined the early relationship between Sudan and South Sudan and explained how that
relationship impacted the formation of both northern and southern identities. He agreed with
other scholars that before the Turko-Egyptian invasion in 1821, Sudan consisted of various
Kingdoms and tribal communities without modern forms of government similar to today's type
(Dhurgon, 1995).
The Turko-Egyptian occupation beginning in 1821 was prompted by the Ottoman
empire's expansionist ambitions and cravings for wealth and markets. The primary commodities
of interest in Sudan, especially in South Sudan, were slaves, elephant tusks, gold, and timber.
South Sudan and her people became the principal source of these commodities. Dr. Dhurgon
further argued that the Turko-Egyptians and North Sudanese, united as they were by ideology
and Islamic religion, collaborated in their raids against South Sudan for slaves, resulting in
millions of South Sudanese people being taken into slavery and shipped to various Arab and
other locations in the world (Dhurgon, 1995). Although Turko-Egyptian rule lasted for sixty
years, it is significant that South Sudan was never fully brought under the invading foreign
power's control and administration; moreover, when the invading forces left, they did not leave
behind any established system of governance. Similarly, the brief Mahdist administration in the
North (1883-1898) (see below) failed to impose its authority over the whole of the region (Deng,
1995; Dhurgon, 1995; Koul & Logan, 2019). The invaders' failure to fully control the South was
attributed to the hardship of travelling to the region at that early time.1 However, those who did
manage to enter the South were rewarded by the lucrative business of the slave trade. Therefore,
it is worthy of mention that the relationship between Sudan's North and South was not built on
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brotherhood and a spirit of a shared common identity. Instead, Northerners looked at Southerners
as nothing but a commodity to be sold as slaves and referred to them as "Abid" – i.e., "slave"
(Sharky, 2003, p. 19).
In his analysis of the division between North and South, in the context of Islam and
Christianity Douglas H. Johnson claimed that "Sudan has been undergoing Arabization and
Islamization since the invasion of Sudan by the Arab tribes from Upper Egypt, and across the
Red Sea during the Middle Ages" (Johnson, 2003, p. 1). He argued that the Arab invasion of
Sudan has been accepted as a historical fact by both those who think Arabization is a natural and
inevitable process, interrupted in its final stages by British intervention; and by those who see it
as an external threat that required the rallying of indigenous African opposition to stop (Johnson,
2003, p. 1). Frances Mading Deng, in his book War of Vision: Conflict of Identities in Sudan, has
affirmed that the relationship between Egypt and Sudan predated the Turko-Egyptian invasion of
1821. According to Deng, Egypt was the primary contact point for the interaction between Sudan
and the Middle East (Johnson, 2003, p. 6).
Douglas H. Johnson, in The Root Causes of Sudan Civil Wars, argued that the conflict
between the North and the South is complicated and often misunderstood (Johnson, 2003, p. 1).
The historical relationship between Sudan's North and South is deeply rooted in trades of all
kinds, but led by the trafficking of humans (i.e., slavery) and other natural resources and
materials. The Northerners saw the South as an open market where they could buy needed
commodities at a low price (most of the time, these commodities were acquired at no cost).
Johnson offered two explanations for the continuing discord between the North and South. He
argued that the leading reason is that the North and South division is based on periods of
exploitation and slave-raiding carried out by the Arab-North against the African-South. In turn,
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that unequal relationship gave the North an upper hand in the governance of a territory that was
divided, not only geographically (North and South), but socially (superior and inferior) and
spiritually (Christian and Muslim) (Johnson, 2003, pp. 5). Dr. Riak M. Dhurgon also elaborated
on the multi-tribal setting in Sudan, arguing that it is generally accepted that racial, religious,
cultural, linguistic and historical diversity existed. However, these diversities have not been used
to enrich and consolidate the country's multi-communal group identity. Instead, they were used
by the ruling Arab elites in the North to oppress, subjugate, and exploit South Sudan's people,
resulting in prolonged political instability and protracted social conflict (Dhurgon, 1995).
Colonialism under the Turkiyya unquestionably established Northern "supremacy" over
the South. Beyond the horrendous exploitation of Southerners as slaves, colonial rule served to
widen the physical separation and limited interaction between the North (which existed within
Egyptian cultural customs and traditions), and the South (which existed in an African cultural
sphere). The new colonial system also gradually created "identity differences" between ethnics
groups in the South by imposing Islamic ideology and Arabism on some and not others. These
early divisions were a significant factor that shaped and influenced the creation of distinct
"Arab" and "African" Sudanese communities -- the bitter fruits of which the Sudanese are
harvesting in the modern-day political arena.
The "Mahadiyya" (1885–1898)
The Turko-Egyptian regime in Sudan collapsed between 1881–1885 due to a religiously-inspired
uprising carried out in Sudan. In her book Living with Colonialism, Nationalism and the Culture
in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, Heather Sharky affirmed that in 1885 the supporters of a Sufi
Scholar named Muhammad Ahamed Al-Mahdi, who claimed himself to be the voice of true
Islam, seized the Turko-Egyptian capital Khartoum. Casualties in the war were estimated to be in
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the thousands, including the British Commander, General Charles Gordon. The Mahdists (AlAnsar) established a state based on Islamic principles and named the city of Omdurman
(currently one of the Tri-Cities of Khartoum) to be their capital (Sharky, 2003, p. 5). In the early
stages of the Mahadiyya, there had been some intention to bring the Southern Sudanese into the
Muslim fold. However, the Mahadiyya did not last long, and it lost control of the South at a very
early stage of its rule (Johnson, 2003, p. 6). Slave-raiding and Slave trading declined during the
Mahadiyya. Johnson argued this was a result of the contraction of state power during that period.
Incursions into the South tended to be almost exclusively for plunder (and for food during the
great famine of 1888-1892), and for more slaves to add to the dwindling supply of domestic
labour as well as soldiers needed for military operations (Johnson, 2003, p .6).
The Anglo-Egyptian Condominium (1898-1956)
The Mahdist victory at Khartoum was a massive blow to British prestige, just as other European
powers were beginning to partition the African continent in a rush to expand their imperial
territories. Sharky concluded that Britain, responding to the pressures of the "European Scramble
for Africa," launched a campaign against the Mahdist State in 1896, and did so by invoking
Egypt's earlier territorial claims to Sudan (Sharky, 2003, p. 5; Rahim, 1966). The invasion,
which was successful in 1898, was extraordinarily violent. The Anglo-Egyptians used guns and
bullets with greater precision, at a more extended range, and using more devastating shrapnel
than anything previously seen in the region. The death tolls revealed the technological disparities
that enabled the Anglo-Egyptian forces to win over the Mahdists. In the final battle of "Karari"
(Omdurman), Mahadist casualties were estimated at 11,000 dead and 16,000 wounded,
compared to 49 killed and 382 wounded on the Anglo-Egyptian side (Sharky, 2003, p. 5). After
the battle at Karari and the defeat of the "Ansar," Britain's connection to Egypt proved beneficial.
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By declaring Egypt to be a “co-dominus” (or partner) in ruling Sudan, Britain established the
fiction of an Anglo-Egyptian partnership, and referred to the Sudanese regime from 1898–1956
as a "Condominium." Further, it placed the territory under the British Foreign Office (rather than
Colonial Office) for supervision. Not only was Sudan technically not a "colony," it was treated
as differently than other colonies.
The Genesis of the Anglo-Egyptian "Condominium" in Sudan
The British conquest of Egypt in 1882 marked the end of the Ottoman Empire's government in
Egypt and the beginning of Britain's imperial presence in North Africa (Collins & Deng, 1984, p.
7; Lesch, 1998, p. 29). The British, however, did not wholly remove the Ottoman presence from
Egypt. For example, they kept the Khedive to run the administration, except for decisions that
concerned national and international security (Collins & Deng, 1984, p.11). Andrew S. Natsios,
in his book Sudan, South Sudan & Darfur: What Everyone Needs to Know, argued that the
British reconquest of Sudan was motivated by their belief that Sudan was part of Egypt. Egypt's
reliance on the Nile waters was central to its survival and legitimized British efforts to secure the
Nile sources (Natsios, 2012, p. 27). Another reason that prompted the reconquest was that the
British feared a Mahdist resurgence under the leadership of the notorious Abdullah Taishi.
Furthermore, they (the British) wanted to secure their East African colonies (See Natsios, 2012,
p. 27-29; Sharky, 2008, p. 4; & Dhurgon, 1995). Ann Lesch, in her book, Sudan: Contested
National Identities, argued that Britain sought control over Sudan for imperial strategic reasons
that were primarily related to preventing other European powers from seizing the sources of the
Nile and gaining footholds along the Red Sea from which they could threaten their sea route to
India (Lesch, 1998, p. 29). Added to all of the above, Britain had been the de-facto ruler of Egypt
since 1882, and the official justification was the restoration of Turko-Egyptian sovereignty on

20

Sudan, which they believed to be an Egyptian colony. Therefore, when they defeated Mahdiyya
in 1898, Britain established a joint colonial regime known as the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium.
The British Colonial Administration's Distinctive "Southern Policy."
South Sudan's administrative area was comprised of three provinces -- Equatoria, Bahar Elgazal
and Upper Nile Province. That land was inhabited by more than sixty-four ethnic groups, divided
between three more prominent groups: Bantus, Nilotic, and Lou. Following the British
reconquest of Sudan, they capitalized on the disparity between the Northern and Southern
Sudanese peoples. They intensified existing differences in identity and religion by establishing
different governance systems -- one for the North and one for the South. The government system
in the North was designed to dissuade Northerners from following the Mahdist and Ansar Group.
As the sub-title, "Patterns of Conquest and Occupation, North & South" of Johnson's book
indicates, these decisions were based on a strategic understanding of the significant problems
facing British colonial rule. Specifically, Johnson asserted that when the Anglo-Egyptians
reconquered Sudan, they chose to implement distinctively different governance forms than the
former colonial (Turko-Egyptian) rulers had established.
In the North, the goal was to suppress any resurgence of Mahdism. Egyptians (now
partners in the condominium), utilized their friendship with the large section of the disgruntled
Muslim Sudanese population in different cities and towns of North who detested the Ansar
regime. The Egyptians also used their followers in religion (the Mirghani Family and the
Khatmiyya Section founders), who supported them against the Mahdists and their Khalifa
Abdallah and convinced them to join the new government (Johnson, 2003, p. 9). Furthermore,
they reinstated tribal leaders whom the Mahdist has purged and replaced them with their agents.
See (Collins & Deng, 1984; Deng, 1995; and Koul & Logan, 2019).
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Before World War I, the condominium regime underwent a quick transition from military
occupation to civil administration, when civilian British Officials replaced all military governors
in the Northern Provinces. Further, the police took over responsibility for rural security from the
army. Northern Sudanese began to be recruited into the police force and some army units,
replacing the Egyptian and Sudanese former slave soldiers (Johnson, 2003, p .9). The strategy of
setting up a different system of governance in the North was a tactical move by the new AngloEgyptian Condominium government to secure itself from any threat of resurgent Mahdism, and
in this it succeeded.
In the South, according to Johnson, the political situation was different. Except for a few
garrisons at Fashuda, Bor and Rajaf, the Mahdist state did not exercise significant control over
the region during its reign; therefore, there was no need to wean people away from Mahdism by
offering them rewards to renew their loyalty to the government as they did in the North
(Dhurgon, 1995; Johnson, 2003). The South was looked at by both Turko-Eqyptian and AngloEgyptian colonial regimes through the same lens of rejection and repudiation. The intruders did
not offer services and help Southerners, but rather took them into slavery and a life of servitude.
Whatever government there was, was not set up to meet their needs, and the new colonial elite
used force and coercive action to ensure the peoples' loyalty (Johnson, 2003, p. 10). Another
piece of misinformation, fed to many scholars and politicians who wrote about the unique British
government system in South Sudan, was that the British wanted to “protect” South Sudan from
the central government in Khartoum. Instead, their real goal was to annex South Sudan to their
East Africa colonies. It is argued that South Sudan, at that stage of history, was not influential
politically, but economically it was seen as an area to capture slaves and other natural resources
such as ivory (elephant tusks) and gold. It is worth mentioning that building a nation with a
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unified South Sudanese identity was not a part of the colonial mindset; what was important was
the bigger picture involving which European countries would control East Africa.
Before the application of the Southern Policy, there were already different organizational/
development patterns in North and South, and Johnson argued that the Southern Policy put into
words what was already common administrative practice. This practice had been labelled
"Indirect Rule" in other parts of British Africa, but in Sudan, it was more commonly called
'Devolution' or 'Native Administration.' In essence, this policy set out that colonial peoples' local
administration should be conducted through indigenous structures of authority, employing
indigenous laws and customs, as long as these were consistent with British ideas of good
government and practice (Johnson, 2003, p. 11).
To ensure this consistency, despite their avowed support for indigenous traditions, as part
of “Indirect Rule," the British could appoint and dismiss chiefs and establish courts that applied
British, rather than indigenous codes of procedure, and these frequently deviated from customary
laws and punishments. Within the indirect rule system, the British could also raid cattle camps to
collect taxes, continue the "corvee system" (forcing people to work without pay to construct
roads), resumed the state monopoly on the sale of ivory which was first introduced in the period
of the Turkiyya. According to Robert O. Collins, Frances M. Deng and Ann Lesch, "There was an
inherent contradiction between British intervention to promote Native Administration and its erosion of
tribal custom and authority.'" (Lesch, 1998, p. 31; Collins & Deng, 1984, p .9). Whatever its intention
might have been, Indirect Rule did not treat the people who lived in the South as a "coherent

entity." Thus, it reinforced previous practices, and we argue that it intensified separation from the
North aa well as promoting "isolated identities" in the South.
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The "Closed District Ordinance."
With its diverse ethnic composition, South Sudan proved to be complex and challenging to
control, not only for the former two colonial systems (the Turkiyya and the Mahdiyya) but for
the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium as well. This situation prompted the British to pursue a
"pacification program" (that continued for well over twenty years), with more determination than
seen previously under the Turkiyya or the Mahdiyya governments.
As part of this policy, the British attempted to seal off the South from the North in order
(as they claimed) to "protect" the South from Muslim influence. Thus, in the 1920s, they
introduced the "Closed Border Ordinance." That order was intended to stop the Arab tribes from
capturing slaves, seizing cattle, forcefully confiscating grain from the South Sudanese. It also
sought to end the alleged pressure to convert the South to Islam and halt Nothern pressure on the
South's control of the Nuba Mountains. The British also shared the previous conquerors'
perception that South Sudan's people were primitive and pagan and concluded that they required
moral guidance of the type that the Christian missionaries from Europe could provide (Lesch,
1998, p. 31). Generally speaking, the British officials were hostile toward Islam and sought to
keep Arab and Islamic influences out of East Africa entirely.
As initially articulated, the "Closed District Order" of 1922 applied to Kordofan, Darfur,
part of Kassala and the White Nile Province, as well as South Sudan (Lesch, 1998, p. 32). It
mandated that Sudanese who lived outside those areas could travel to or live there only if they
obtained a special permit. The "Permits to Trade Ordinance" of 1925 allowed colonial authorities
to exclude Northern traders, who had previously dominated commerce in the southern
countryside (Collins & Deng, 1984; Dhurgon, 1995; Deng, 1995 & Johnson, 2003). The British
separation of South Sudan and other marginalized areas from the North was deeply resented by
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the Northern Sudanese, who felt that British action was aimed against Islam and Arab identity in
Sudan (Lesch, 1998, p. 33).
In conclusion, the closed district ordinance, whether it was for the protection of Southern
and other marginalized people of Sudan or to stop the expansion of Islam in Africa, was without
precedent. History and the current level of violence in Sudan will be judge of its impact.
An Independent Sudan (1956-2011)
On January 1, 1956, The Republic of Sudan was the first country under British colonialization in
Africa to earn its independence. Many reasons have been identified as the main factors leading
the British to relinquish control of Sudan. Among these is what Andrew S. Natsios articulated in
his book Sudan, South Sudan & Darfur -- that the chaos produced by World War II had inspired
many African and Arab nationalists to seek independence. The professional indigenous elites in
French, British and Dutch colonial empires had witnessed the German conquest of continental
Europe and siege of Britain and the former invincibility of their colonial masters disappeared.
Following the end of the war, this perception of imperial vulnerability helped accelerate
independence movements, most noticeably in the African continent, including Sudan (Natsios,
2012, p. 35). Another factor was what Natsios termed the "Professional Class of the Nile River,"
a political organization originating in Egypt, with the goal of unifying Egypt and Sudan into one
country. That move posed a threat to British interests in the region and potentially jeopardized
their control over the Suez Canal (Natsios, 2012, p. 35 & Dhurgon, 1995).
Three issues were generally involved in the Sudanese independence movement; the first
was the relationship between Egypt and Sudan. On this, the Umma party (led by the Mahadi's
descendants) called for a completely independent Sudan, while the Khatmiyya (the supporters of
Egypt for more than a century) advocated for union with Egypt. The second was the status of the
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South. Most Southerners were unprepared for rapid independence and the few who were
politically active demanded a say in the South's position in an independent Sudan. It is worth
mentioning that the main Northern parties tried to minimize Southern influences in the
independence movement or exclude them entirely from the process because Southerners were
neither Muslims nor Arabs (Johnson, 2003; Koul & Logan, 201). In this, they were largely
successful. The third issue, according to Natsios, was the relationship between the state and
religion. There were muslims in the South and communists, socialists and secularists in the
North who supported a secular Sudan. However, the main parties of the North insisted on the
formation of an explicitly Islamic State (Natsios, 2012, p. 37). Only with the Comprehensive
Peace Agreement of 2005, combined with the referendum in South Sudan in 2011, has the third
issue been addressed. Nonetheless, the status of the Islamic religion within the Sudanese state
remains a source of antagonism with in Northern Sudanese politics. Others articulated different
reasons for the British granting Sudan its independence. For example, Johnson and Deng argued
that the British feared that Egypt would somehow control the North -- (an unacceptable outcome
(and a well-founded suspicion, as independence did not stop Egyptian meddling in Sudan's
internal affairs) (Deng, 1995; Natsios, 2012; Koul & Logan, 2019).
The South had been critical to British attempts to ensure that another colonial power did
not encroach on its East African holdings. The French had secured Somalia and Djibouti in the
East, and they had troops stationed at "Fashoda," the Shilluk Reith capital in the Upper Nile
Province. Belgium was involved in a similar move; they had seized Rejaf, a town in Equatoria
Province adjacent to the Congo. In negotiations surrounding independence, the British agreed
with those South Sudanese who demanded a federal system. However, they decided that this
demand had to be "postponed" until after independence. Unfortunately, that demand did not
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receive any serious attention from either the British or Northerners. By the time independence
was achieved in 1956, a North/South civil war had been in existence for a year, and the so-called
"Problem of the South" was to dominate the history of an independent Sudan.
We believe that Sudan's prolonged conflict fits well into Azar's theory of Protracted
Social Conflict. There are “Multi Communal Groups," combined with the absence of a unified
identity, and a grossly unequal distribution of power. Francis Deng offered three alternative
approaches to the resulting crisis. First, he argues that by bringing to the surface the realities of
the African elements of identity in the North-- thereby revealing characteristics shared by all
Sudanese-- a new basis for creating a shared identity could be established that fosters equitable
participation and distribution. This model became John Garang's position in the six-year
transitions period agreed to in 2005. Second, if the issues that divided Sudanese proved
insurmountable, Deng argued for a “diversified coexistence” framework within a loose federal or
confederal arrangement. Third, he concluded that partitioning the country (along justified
borders) might be the only option to end the devastating conflict. Indeed, it was Deng's final
proposal that was implemented in 2011; the results of the referendum were 98% favouring
separation. Despite the overwhelming support for independence, this third solution did not work
--the "New Republic of South Sudan" fell into renewed civil war shortly after its birth.
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Chapter Three
“Sudanese Independence, a Civil War and Ten Years of Peace”
Many scholars and political scientists (for example, Douglas H. Johnson, Frances M. Deng,
Abdel Salam Sidahmed), as well as other academicians, have written extensively about Sudan’s
prolonged civil wars and their consequences in terms of humanitarian hardships and lack of
infrastructural development. This chapter will first focus on the British role in the conflict,
specifically how their precipitous action in granting independence (and abandoning the South in
the process), contributed to the conflict between North and South Sudan. Further, it will discuss
the genesis of the “Anyanya” conflict, which actually started in the year before the Republic of
Sudan attained its Independence from the British in 1956. It will continue with an assessment of
the impact of the Torit Mutiny (and the ensuing massacre of Northern Sudanese) on the
downward trajectory of North/South relations culminating in a Civil War. It ends with a
discussion of the Addis Ababa Agreement that terminated the war and started Sudan’s most
prolonged period of peace.
The British Withdrawal
Several talks, meetings, and conferences were conducted between the British, North and South
Sudanese before what was to become the Anyanya rebellion erupted in August 1955. Among the
most important of these conferences and meetings was the “Juba Conference” of 1947. Ann
Mosley Lesch, in her book Sudan – Contested National Identities, wrote disparagingly about the
conference, arguing that the British arranged it only to avoid criticism for not having done so
(Lesch, 1998, p. 34). She argued that the conference agenda did not include the key issue of
“unity” vs. “separation” of the two parts of Sudan. Instead, it discussed how South Sudan should
be represented in the legislature and what special safeguards were needed for the South (Lesch,
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1998, p. 34). Furthermore, to the great disappointment of Southern Sudanese politicians, the
British intentionally selected only seventeen Southern Sudanese as trusted delegates to the
conference; and those nominated and selected individuals were all on thier payroll as tribal
chiefs, junior officials, and police officers (see Dhurgon, 1995; Deng, 1995; Johnson, 2003;
Koul & Logan, 2019). Lesch concluded that the British policy would have made sense if it had
led to the South’s separation from the North, either turning it into an independent state or
attaching it to a neighboring African country. Although few and far between, British officials
suggested these solutions, they were never seriously considered (Lesch 1998, p. 35).
In October 1954, Southern Sudanese leaders organized a second Juba Conference, with
no authorities or delegates present from the North to direct the results (Natsios, 2012, p.40). The
meeting voted for independence from Egypt (affirming a National Assembly vote against union
with the North), but leaving open the condition that the South be given autonomy within a
federal system. If this was not possible, the Southerners insisted on self-determination, including
the possibility of independence from the North. Thus, at the second Juba Conference, Andrew
Natsios claimed the emerging Southern leadership proposed two of the options that were to
become central features of Comprehensive Peace Agreement’s (CPA), that some 50 years later
was finally negotiated in 2005 (Natsios, 2012, p. 40) - an autonomous South within a united
Sudan or self-determination, leading to possible separation of the South (Rahim, 1966). The
process leading to the independence of Sudan clearly ignored the South and has to be seen as an
obvious opportunity missed to put Sudan on a viable path toward independence.
Douglas H. Johnson, in his book The Root Causes of Sudan Civil War, provided a
compelling narrative of the conflict between North and South Sudan, and how in a rush, the
British left Sudan, abandoning all the promises of protection they had made to the Southern
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Sudanese. Johnson reasoned that the mutiny leading to the Anyanya rebellion (which actually
marked the beginning of the first civil war), served to hasten, rather than delay Sudanese
Independence, as “it brought home forcibly to the British Government the paradox of its
continued vague responsibility in Sudan without any longer having the power to control or shape
events in the country” (Johnson, 2003, p. 29). Furthermore, the British action of granting the
Sudanese their Independence before the Sudanese had agreed on a permanent constitution
indicated an avoidance of the legal procedure for self-determination that already had been
decided upon between the British and Egyptian Governments. It is worth mentioning here that
Southern Sudanese politicians were persuaded to accept the country’s independence after
receiving an assurance from the British Government that they would exercise restraint in
restoring order in the South and that the Sudanese Government would adhere to their request that
a federal constitution be given serious consideration. Consequently, the date of Independence
was brought forward, and the country became a fully independent nation on January 1st 1956,
with numerous issues of its nationhood still unresolved, as well as being at war with itself
(Johnson, 2003, p. 29).
The First Civil War (Anyanya)- (1955 to 1972)
While Sudan’s civil wars have been identified as Africa’s most prolonged civil conflict, they do
not stand alone among the continent’s costly wars. The end of the World War II marked the
beginning of African colonies’ quest for emancipation and independence. While in the decades
following the war many achieved their independence, the reality of communal ethnic formation,
ethnic hegemony and sectarianism remained and have resulted in economic hardship, greed, and
competition for power – all leading to conflict (Collier & Hoeffler, 2000). In their article
“Insurgency and Civil Wars,” James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin asserted that African nations
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were leading globally in the incidence of civil wars (Fearon & Laitin, 2003). Taisier M. Ali and
Robert Matthews, in the Introduction of their book Civil Wars in Africa, Roots, and Resolutions,
argued that civil wars had destroyed the African continent, causing indescribable misery in the
lives of African people, destroying their economies, weakening their political institutions, and
undermining the social fabric of their societies (Taisier & Matthews, 1995, p. 1). They described
the conflicts and civil wars in Africa as a pandemic that had persisted for many years, and that
every country in Africa had unique factors that caused them. This chapter aims to highlight the
causes of the civil wars in Sudan and explain why Sudan and South Sudan (together the largest
country in Africa) have been involved in civil wars since the country became independent in
1956.
Many scholars and political scientists have written extensively about Sudan’s prolonged
civil wars and their consequences in terms of humanitarian hardships and lack of infrastructural
development. We have examined the British role in the conflict, specifically how their
precipitous action in granting independence (abandoning the South in the process), contributed to
the conflict between North and South Sudan. We will now discuss the genesis of the “Anyanya”
conflict, and how the Torit Mutiny (and the ensuing massacre of Northern Sudanese),
contributed to the downward trajectory of North-South relations leading to the First Civil War.
A leading cause of the first Anyanya conflict was that Nothern government officials,
merchants and military officers streamed South to occupy the posts previously held by the
departing British (Deng, 1995; Dhurgon, 1995; Johnson, 2003; and Collins & Deng, 1984). It
was documented that eight hundred such posts were given to Notherners, while only eight
positions went to Southerners (Natsios, 2012, p. 41) Needless to say, this caused alienation and
anger among Southerners. In July 1955, spontaneous riots broke out in Yambio, the former
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capital of Western Equatoria; police intervened by firing into the crowd killing eight people
(Natsios, 2012, p. 41). One month later, a mutiny took place in Torit, the base of the old colonial
Equatorial Corps (Natsios, 2012, p. 41) and the First Civil War was underway.
The Torit Mutiny, August 1955
Torit is a small city in Western Equatoria Province, close to the border with DRC (Congo). The
British established it as a military garrison and had stationed the Equatorial Corps – (Southern
Sudan Division) there. In a televised interview aired in November 2019, Joseph Lago (leader of
the rebel army during the First Civil War), recalled two events that were of significant
importance in the history of South Sudan. The first was the British departure from Sudan, an
event that was received with jubilation in Northern Sudan, but was met with bitter
disappointment and uncertainty in the South. The second event was the Torit Mutiny, which
many Southern Sudanese politicians and scholars see as the turning point in Sudan’s
contemporary history, especially in its history of relations with the North.
It is argued in this paper that ‘Torit” was the birthplace of the idea of “South Sudanese
Unification,” although, as we will explore it in depth in the following chapter, it failed to create a
unified “South Sudanese Identity.” According to Joseph Lago, the disappointment and mistrust
Southerners experienced at the hands of the Egyptian, Turkish and the British colonial systems,
had become a common theme at the time when Northern Sudanese started arriving in a
significant numbers in the South following the British departure. Southerners perceived
Northerners as a “fourth colonial power” coming to replace the British and they welcomed these
migrants with conflicting perceptions and embedded fear (Lago, 2019).
To protect newly-appointed government officials, civilian traders, teachers, and others,
the Northern Government decided to transfer Southern Sudanese military officers in
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commanding positions and personnel from the South to Northern Sudan and replace them with
officers and troops from the North. This action resulted in heightened tension among the military
and police service members who were from the South.
Government officials, scholars, news media and oral sources alike have testified that
multiple factors contributed to the ignition of the mutiny in Torit. However, the most immediate
factor that caused mutiny in Torit was the killing of a South Sudanese soldier by an Arab officer
in August 1955. When Southern troops witnessed that killing, they rushed to the weapons depot,
seized rifles, and started shooting -- murdering Northern officials as well as merchants, including
their families. The riot spread like wildfire to Wau, and Malakal, although there is no evidence
indicating that any of these outbreaks were planned or organized (Natsios, 2012, p. 41). Over all,
more than three hundred people were killed in the violence, most of them from the North. Arabs
blamed Christian missionaries for inciting the violence, an allegation that was later proved
unfounded by the investigation committee comprised of Arab and British members.
The uprising in the South convinced the British Government to accelerate its departure
from Sudan, since British officials no longer felt they had the power to control or shape events.
Thus, Britain was anxious to grant formal Independence, even before the Sudanese parliament
had agreed on a permanent constitution and initiated a circumvention of the legal procedures for
self-determination settled upon by Egypt and Britain (Johnson, 2003, p. 29). On January 1st
1956, the British hastily departed, and the Sudanese state was born with an unstable and
unprepared government in charge (Lesch, 1998, p. 41; Johnson, 2003, p. 29; and Lago, 2019).
Impact of the First Civil War
It is argued in this paper that the First Civil War had brought the South Sudanese together
to face a common enemy, but had failed to build a unified identity among the sixty four different
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ethnicities that inhabited the land. By modern standards, as revealed by Johnson, in its first years,
the civil war was fought almost entirely in the South and was conducted at a relatively low level
of intensity. The Southern guerrillas were joined together very loosely and had no external
military support. They armed themselves mainly by stealing from the police outposts, an
occasional ambush of army patrols or through the defection of Southern police and soldiers
(Johnson, 2003, p.31).
Mekki Shibeika, in his book Sudan Over the Centuries, argued that in spite of the
bravery of their bearers, spears, sticks, and light riffles did not fare well against the modern
machine gun (Shibeika, 1956, p.27). The Northern Army came to engage the Southerners
equipped with weapons manufactured in Britain, while ten men from the rebels lined up behind
one man carrying a rifle. They would wait until the first carrier of the gun was killed, then the
next in line would seize the gun and continue the battle (Lago, 2019). Hostilities were largely
confined to the South. While not a bloody as the Second Civil War, by its end in 1972 half a
million people had been killed and hundreds of thousands more fled into exile as refugees.
Problems of Disorganization and Disunity among Southerners
As mentioned, the catalyst for the military uprising in Torit was not an organized and planned
event. It occurred due to real grievances and negative sentiments held by Southerners against
Northerners (mainly Arabs). Many South Sudanese fled the country to neighbouring Uganda,
and in the early 1960s they formed what was termed the “Leadership of the Exile Movement,”
later known as “Anyanya,” which is “Snake Venom” in the Lotuko dialect (LeRiche & Arnold,
2013, p. 25). Johnson described the Anyanya leadership as predominantly Equatorian. Both Fr.
Saturnino and Joseph Oduho were from Torit (and of the Lotuko ethnic group); Aggrey Jaden
was from Juba (of the Bari Ethnic group); while William Deng Nhial was the first influential
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Dinka leader, and he was from Tonj, in Bahar al-Gazal (Johnson, 2003, p. 32). Because of its
disorganized nature, the rebellion failed in its early stages to attract significant members from the
three larger ethnic groups (Dinka, Nuer and Shilluk) until after 1965, ten years after the start of
the war. This finally occurred when Joseph Lago, a South Sudanese and an Officer in the Sudan
Arm Forces (SAF), defected from the Sudanese army and joined the rebels (Lago, 2019). The
movement’s leadership in Uganda continued to attract most of the Southerners Sudanese
refugees, the majority of which came from Equatoria, which had more access to East Africa than
Southerners from either Bahar al-Gazal, or Upper Nile Province.
Infrastructural Destruction
The British policy of development in Sudan had very little to do with either human or
infrastructural development. Instead, as argued by Sharif Harir and Terje Tvedt in their book
Short Cut to Decay: The Case of Sudan, their main concern was the exploitation of Sudan’s
resources such as a free workforce, Ivory and other natural resources. It was British policy to use
local Sudanese in achieving their objectives. Only in the North and Central Sudan did they
develop various agriculture and transport systems, because these areas produced cotton, dates
and other products which Britain needed (Harir & Tvedt, 1994, p. 34; Kalian, 2007, p. 520).
The British developed these areas to pursue their policy of becoming self-sufficient in the area of
agriculture products. However, Southern Sudan was not geographically and economically
prepared for agricultural projects, except in the Upper Nile province, which produced products
(grain and sasami), which were less important to Great Britain.
There was some physical infrastructural development in the South during the Ibrahim
Abboud regime (1958-1964), such as schools, hospitals, and government administration offices.
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These infrastructures survived the Ananya war (1955-1972) because most of the Anyanya
fighting with the government took place outside the cities.
The Addis Ababa Accord
The Addis Ababa Accord brought an end to the First Civil War. The discussions between the
South Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM) (under the leadership of Joseph Lago), and the Head
of the Sudanese Government (Jaafar Numayri), leading to the Accord took place in the Ethiopian
capital Addis Ababa. According to Douglas H. Johnson, that Agreement not only brought peace
to Sudan, but as a unique resolution to the civil war, brought great international acclaim to the
African nation and its leaders (Johnson, 2003, p. 39). Andrew Natsios agreed, but added that
while leaders of other African states may have been sympathetic to the Southern cause, they
were concerned about how the Southern Sudanese rebellion might impact separatist tendencies in
their own countries, as many were dealing with the same problems as faced by Sudan (Natsios,
2012, p. 51). Among these, Nigeria had been torn apart by the Biafra civil war. Ethiopia faced a
decade of independence movements in Eritrea (as well as the war with Somalia over the status of
the ethnic Somali population), while Zaire was threatened by separatists in Katanga Province
(Dhurgon, 1995; Lago, 2019). Natsios argued that support from African nations for Southern
Sudanese independence would create a dangerous precedent (Natsios, 2012, p. 51).
Since the 1960s, the U.S State department policy had opposed any separatist movement
in Africa.1 However, many Southern Sudanese wished for independence, a dream that finally
was to come true in 2011 (Sidahmed, 1996; Sulton, 1980). Although the Addis Ababa
Agreement brought ten years of relative calm (1972 – 1983), we argue in this chapter that the
Agreement was bound to fail, sooner or later, and at least in part, that this failure was because it
had not been adequately explained and sold to the public. Also, the guarantor and the facilitator
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of the Agreement, although they were internationally recognized entities, lacked popular support
on the ground.
It must be mentioned that Numayri had first attempted to end the Civil War militarily. In
that he had received military hardware and support from Russia and Egypt, Numayri believed
that he could destroy the Anyanya and its supporters. Little did he know that the South Sudanese
rebels also had received equipment and training from Israel. With external support of their own,
the Southern Sudanese rebels were able to fight the Sudanese Army effectively and scored
repeated victories in 1970 and 1971 (Natsios, 2012; Lago, 2019). With the North incapable of
defeating Southern forces in the countryside (a pattern that repeated itself in the Second Civil
War (SPLA/M)), by 1971 it became increasingly apparent that military solution to the “Southern
Problem” was unlikely (Koul & Logan, 2019). Jaafar Numayri changed course. He eliminated
his former communist comrades, who had attempted a coup against him. He hanged his Minister
of Southern Affairs, Joseph Garang (not related to the John Garang, see below), and replaced
him with another Southerner, Abel Alier, a skilled lawyer, negotiator and ideological moderate.
Alier accepted the position on the condition that he could quietly begin talks with Southern
political leaders about a peace settlement.
Provisions of the Agreement
The Addis Ababa negotiations commenced with the important provision of a “United Sudan” as
a precondition. Johnson, in his book, revealed that many exiled South Sudanese, including some
on the negotiating team, were unhappy about abandoning the goal of independence; as well,
there was a clear difference of understanding between the government and the SSLM delegation
regarding the nature of “regional autonomy,” which was proposed during the negotiations.
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Among the Addis Ababa Agreement’s provisions was the creation of a Federal Sudanese
State, in which South Sudan would be granted an autonomous government within a “United
Sudan.” It would be governed by a Legislative Assembly and a Council of Ministers (Sidahmned
& Sidahmed, 2005, p. 41). The Southern Government would be run by Southerners appointed
by Numayri, with the advice and consent of the High Executive Council.2 English was to be the
Official Language of the South and the language of instruction in schools. The status of the
Islamic religion was not discussed, thus it was not a stumbling block; nevertheless, it emerged as
one of the leading causes of the Second Civil War (1983 – 2005).
Looking at the Addis Ababa Accord from a different perspective, it appears as if both
sides, the government and the rebels alike, placed almost exclusive emphasize on ending the war,
meaning that the main reasons that led to the rebellion in the first place had not been suitably
addressed. Fundamental issues that were missed (or that were intentionally left out) during
negotiations were the location of external and internal borders; the country’s national identity
(Arab vs. African or both); and, importantly, the means by which to promote the concept of a
“national identity” for Sudan. Although the Agreement was negotiated under the new
constitution, which had separated religion from the state, as Mathew LeRiche and Mathew
Arnold pointed out, it was never implemented (LeRiche & Arnold, 2013, p.28). As we shall see
in the following chapter, these issues (and others) became the central reasons behind the igniting
of the Second Civil War in Sudan (1983 – 2005).
Southern Autonomy within a United Sudan
In the years immediately following the Addis Ababa Agreement there was widespread peace and
relative prosperity in the South. Moreover, contrary to expectations, following the first Southern
Regional Government’s (SRG) term in 1977, its members could take pride in that they had
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indeed been able to govern effectively (LeRiche & Arnold, 2013, p.28; Lago, 2019; Collins,
2004). The government had created the basic bureaucratic and judicial structures of governance,
assisted a million Southerners returning from exile and presided over a successful election for
the regional assembly in 1973 (LeRiche & Arnold, 2013, p. 28). However, following these initial
successes, Southern Sudanese political space became increasingly fractionalized between those
who supported Abel Alier and those who supported Joseph Lago for leadership positions on the
High Executive Council’s (Harir & Tvedt, 1994; Lago, 2019).
This chapter argues that these political differences exposed the weakness of the SRG and
rendered it open to Northern manipulation. President Numayri proved to be a master at such
manipulation, especially in his role in constituting the HEC. As Douglas Johnson has argued,
despite widespread Southern perceptions that the Addis Ababa Agreement had disadvantaged the
South institutionally, Khartoum’s interference was mainly undertaken with Southern leaders’
acquiescence or active participation (Johnson, 2003, p. 40). The reality was that Southern
politicians could not effectively work together to counter Northern influence and manipulation,
as major political partiies and dominant individuals engaged in debilitating competition and
confrontation. LeRiche and Arnold concluded that Southern solidarity was further complicated
by rising ethnic divisions, notably between Equatorians and Dinka, as well as other Nilotic,
cattle-raising ethnic groups such as the Nuer. Because of these divisions within Southern Sudan’s
political space, the SRG failed to challenge Khartoum with respect to important issues such as
sharing resources fairly, promotingt economic development, moderating educational policy, or
pushing for judgements regarding the placement of contested internal, regional, and
international borders (LeRiche & Arnold, 2013).
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Furthermore, the Agreement stipulated that Anyanya insurgents must be absorbed into
the National Army. This proved highly problematic and became a crucial factor in the collapse of
the Agreement (Fearon & Laitin, 2003, p. 81; Dhurgon, 1995; Sulton, 1980, p. 148). It is worth
elaborating further here on the Agreement’s weaknesses, especially that its provisions for
Southern Security (an issue that had been especially contentious during the negotiations) were
inadequate. Despite the initial demands for a separate army, the SSLM eventually accepted
Emperor Haile Selassie’s argument for a compromise, which turned out to be a weak point in the
Agreement. Selassie pressed for integrating the Anyanya into the National Army, but
maintaining a Southern Command, half of which was to be formed from former insurgents. Lago
(and few top officers ) were guaranteed high-level posts in the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF),
police or other civil government positions (LeRiche & Arnold, 2013, p. 29).
However, the complicated arrangements embedded in the Agreement, were too
convoluted for the Anyanya ranks and file to accept, a situation that prompted Abel Alier, the
First President of the HEC, to comment:
[T]he Anyanya was fighting for political Independence against the “Arabs” until the
Agreement came and took them by surprise. It was not the type of arrangements the
ordinary Anyanya had expected, be in one Army with their long-standing enemy (Alier,
1992).
In short, the Agreement needed to be explained and sold to what was at best a skeptical Southern
population.
In conclusion, Douglas H. Johnson argued that the semi-autonomous government had
achieved at best qualified legislative authority, poorly defined economic powers, and an unclear
understanding of the composition of its security forces (Johnson, 2003, p. 40). Most Southerners
assumed that integration of the two armed forces would take place within five years, and that the
proportion of Nothern and Southern soldiers in the Southern Command would remain equal, and
40

that southern troops would remain garrisoned in the South. But Numayri had different ideas. The
first was to protect his government from possible coup attempts mounted against him by
Northern political opponents. Thus he wanted to keep a good number of southern soldiers close
to him to assure his protection. Secondly, the transferring of Southern Sudanese soldiers to the
North would eliminate the threat of their rebeling again, or building new loyalty to their Nothern
officers, who then might pose a threat to him. For its part, the Southern Army insisted that the
agreed to process be completed within five years (Deng, 1995; Alier, 1992; Johnson, 2003).
However, what the Southern Sudanese Army didn’t know was that there were no explicit
provisions in the Agreement for the Army’s status after the five year period (Johnson, 2003, p.
41).
The Addis Ababa Agreement was ratified and embodied in the Regional SelfGovernment Act in March 1972, and it was incorporated in the Permanent Constitution in 1973.
The constitution recognized a strong executive presidency for the nation and suggested
safeguarding the Agreement by requiring a referendum to be held in the South before any
amendments to it could be made (Koul & Logan, 2019; Deng, 1995; Lago, 2019; Johnson, 2003,
p. 41). This provision set up a fundamental contradiction between the central and regional
governments within the national constitutional structure (Dhurgon, 1995; Collins, 2004).
The powers reserved for the president were a matter of concern for many Nothern
Sudanese. However, at that time, Southern Sudanese leaders tended to regard Numayri as their
personal protector against Nothern opposition to the Addis Ababa Agreement. Therefore, in
general, they were not only willing to let Numayri have the powers he claimed, but were glad
that he had them (Johnson, 2003, p. 41).
Ten Years of Peace (1972-1983)
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The 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement had silenced the guns fired by North and South Sudanese
against each other for the past seventeen years. During that time of war, life in the South had
cometo a standstill and . South Sudan became a deserted land. The war had killed half a million
people and dispalced hundreds of thousands more; school buildings were turned into military
barracks and hospitals mainly treated wounded soldiers. After sundown, in the South no one was
allowed to be on the streets except for uniformed men and women. However, with the signing
of peace in Addis Ababa in 1972, life started returning to normal. Ann Mosely Lesch argued in
her book Sudan: Contested National Identities, that the Agreement established a regional SelfGovernment Act for the three Southern Provinces, and an autonomous government was indeed
put in place. The three southern provinces became one region, whose provincial assembly would
elect a High Executive Council (HEC). The regional government was responsible for internal
security and local administration in social, cultural and economic areas. The government had an
independent budget, with its revenue coming from local taxes and fees, plus special funds from
the central government to narrow the infrastructural and human development gap with the Norht
(Lesch, 1998, p. 46).
As noted, the Addis Ababa Agreement and the Regional Self-Government Act were
incorporated into Sudan’s permanent Constitution of 1973. A strong article was affixed that if an
amendment would be necessitated, it would require a three-quarters vote in the national
assembly and a two-thirds vote of the southern electorate in a referendum. Lesch argued that this
double protection would prevent the Northern majority from making arbitrary changes to the
Agreement (Lesch, 1998, p.47). Another applicable provision of the permanent constitution (if it
had been implemented honestly), was the provision respecting Sudan’s dual Arab and African
identity; respect for Islam, Christianity and “Noble Spiritual Beliefs;” equality of all persons
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before the law and the prohibition of any form of discrimination based on religion, race,
language or gender. The Addis Ababa Agreement as well as the Constitution. articulated an
“ethnic, pluralistic model” for Sudan (Lesch, 1998, p. 47; Lual, 2013, p. 16).
Peace Dividends, Human Development and Infrastructural Rebuilding
Under the terms of the Addis Ababa Agreement which lasted from 1972 – 1983, an ordinary
person could live in the South in relative peace and tranquillity. Also during those years many
developments took place that were encouraging, such as rebuilding of ruined schools, building of
hospitals and road construction ; as well, land was divided and registered. Everything appeared
calm and safe, but the unforunately the calm was of the type that appears befor the storm.
Part of the problem was that the SRG’s full authority did not extend to provisions for
local government and law enforcement. As well, most of its ability to raise revenue from local
taxation derived from the central government. On security matters, the Agreement granted
amnesty to rebel soldiers and provided for their absorption into the Southern Defence Corps
(comprised of 6,000 soldiers each from Nothern and Southern personnel), to form a unified
national force (Iyob & Khadiagala, 2006, p. 85). It is significant here, that Southern troops’
participation in the SAF applied only to the Army division. Other military units such as the Air
Force, Navy, and other technical divisions were not included in the absorption formula. Thus,
Anyanya soldiers were not allowed to join these units, even by the criteria of merit and/or
experience (Lual, 2013, p.101).
When the First Civil War ended, the new government was faced with many hurdles and
obstacles; most significantly, the Southern Sudan economy was in shambles. Agriculture projects
that had been established during the colonial era had been abandoned and infrastructure was
destroyed. Plus a million people had fled the country, some into the bush and others became
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refugees in the neighbouring countries and around the world. As well, both Lesch and Johnson
argued that the regional government was “starved” for funds to undertake reconstruction and
rehabilitation; however, it failed to receive allotments for developmental funds from the central
government (Lesch, 1998, p. 47; Johnson, 2003, p. 40). Southerners were also intensely
disappointed because the North-South socioeconomic gap continued to widen. Therefore, the
controversy over Junglei Canal3 and disputes over natural resources created grievances over
inadequate development financing and economic discrimination.
In addition to all of the above, oil exploration became a contentious issue. In 1979
Chevron (an American company), discovered oil in two areas close to the North-South border
region --‘Muglad’ in South Kordufan and ‘Bentiu’ in Upper Nile, South Sudan. Southerners’
fears that the North would steal their oil were crystalized in November 1980, when Attorney
General Hassan al-Turabi submitted a new map to the Peoples Assembly that shifted the northern
part of Bentiu into the Kordufan region. Lesch attested that although Numayri diffused the
tension by withdrawing the proposed boundary change, he later replaced Southern troops with
Northerners at Bentiu; in addition, he pocketed the proceeds from the Chevron licence (Lesch,
1998, p. 48). Lesch argued that such an action violated Addis Ababa Agreement which stated
such revenue should go to the regional government. Numayri also decided to shift the location of
the site of a proposed oil refinery from Bentiu to Kosti, a strategic rail and river city in the North.
Many Southerners contested that decision because having the refinery in Bentiu would improve
infrastructure, promote economic development and provide jobs to Southern workers.
The controversy over the oil in Bentiu was not the only problem faced by the SRG. The
Addis Ababa Agreement provided for the reversion to the South of areas that belonged to South
Sudan prior to Independence in 1956. That meant the district of Hufrat al-Nahas and Kafia Kingi
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would be returned to Bahar al-Gazal Province. But Hufrat al-Nahas contained copper, and Kafia
Kingi had deposits of uranium and Numayri’s attempt to transfer Hufrat al-Nahas back to Darfur
in 1978 met widespread oppositon and was blocked by members of the National Assembly. The
Agreement also stated that residents of border areas (who had ethnic ties to the South) could
decide by referendum whether to merge with the South. (Lesch, 1998, p. 48). Therefore, the
Abyei district in South Kordufan, Kurmuk and Chali el-Fil districts in the Blue Nile became
eligible to hold the referenda, but the central government never implement the provision in the
five years as agreed on in the Addis Ababa Agreement. Southern politicians such as Samuel Aru
Bol, a former Interior Minister, Samuel Abu John, Frances Deng and many others later argued
that the contest over oil and the other natural resources, in addition to the borer disputes,
commutatively was the main reason for Numayri’s abrogation of the Addis Ababa Agreement
in1983 (Lesch, 1998 ; also see Deng, 1995; Dhurgon, 1995; Johnson, 2003). Lesch specificlly
argued that Numayri would never accept that revenue from natural resources would accrue to the
regional government. Therefore, if the central government was to retain control of the newly
found wealth in the South, he (Numayri) must swiftly end what was left of Southern Autonomy
once and for all (Lesch, 1998, p.48).
Security Arrangements and Absorption of the Anyanya
The Addis Ababa Agreement specified that half of the troops garrisoned in the South would be
from the Ananya. Other local forces, such as the police, prison guards as well as any additional
security and peace maintenance personnel would be recruited entirely from South Sudanese
(Lesch, 1998, p. 49), with recruitment into the National Army proportionaal to the population.
The hidden agenda behind the “proportional” clause emerged later on. Joseoh Lago in his 2019
TV interview claimed that it was to gradually reduce the number of Southerners in the National

45

Army to under 12 percent (Lago, 2019). It is worth mentioning here that the Anyanya forces
were incorporated initially as separate units within the armed forces (SAF). The plan was to
integrate the troops fully by 1977. The absorption and integration process proved to be a tedious
and complex task that taxed both the national and regional governments (Johnson, 2003, p. 41).
Regarding security arrangements, Johnson explained that many guerrillas in the bush were
unwilling to comply with the new security provisions. Additionally, some of those who
complied, resented integration and opted to remain in their insurgent units. Among those who
complied (as Lago recounted in his interview), many were not satisfied with the low ranks they
were given. The integration of the Anyanya into the Army was accomplished within the
proscribed five years. But many in the region were still dissatisfied. Johnson explained that while
the full quota of 6000 Anyanya soldiers was absorbed into the Army, the number of the Nothern
troops in the South was not reduced to an equal number -- 6000 (Johnson, 2003, p. 42).
Many senior ex-Ananya officers were forced to retire early or otherwise eliminated from
the Army, with some transferred to garrisons outside of the South. According to Johnson, in the
early 1980s, such transfers were especially resisted and became one of the factors contributing to
the Bor mutiny in May 1983, whcih immediately preceeded the presidential abolition of the
Southern Regional Government (Johnson, 2003, p. 42). Additionally, Lesch argued that violent
incidents within the army erupted in Juba 1974, Akobo 1975 and Wau 1976 because Southern
troops feared they would be attacked by Nothern soldiers or be transferred to the North (Lesch,
1998, p. 49). The Sudanese government ordered tht the battalion at Aweil be transferred to
Darfur in December 1982, and replaced Southern troops stationed at Bentiu with Northern
soldiers to ensure Khartoum had control over the oil fields.
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The turning point came in January 1983 when Dinka soldiers in the Bor and Pibor
garrisons in Junglei (Upper Nile province), refused orders to move to the North. In response, on
May 16th, 1983, Northern troops attacked them. Hundreds of southern commanders and soldiers
evacuated Bor and Pibor (mainly Battalions 104 and 105) and regrouped them in Ethiopia as
rebel forces (Lesch, 1998; Dhurgon, 1995; Lago, 2019). Soon they were joined by thousands of
soldiers, some supporting the reconstituted Anyanya II, but most joining what was to become the
Sudan Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA), which was formed and led by Colonel John Garang De
Mabior, an officer from the absorbed forces who had deserted to join the rebels Lesch. 1998).
The Dissolution of the Addis Ababa Agreement
Many factors prompted Numayri’s dissolution of the Addis Ababa Agreement. When asked why
he was abrogating what he had built, his answer was that the “Agreement was neither a Bible nor
Qur’an. The Agreement was made by me, a man, and the same man can destroy it for the
nations’ common good” (Numayri, TV interview Sept 1979).
Iyob and Khadiagala argue in their book Sudan: The Elusive Quest for Peace, that
managing the quasi-autonomous governmental institutions in Juba posed more constraints than
opportunities for Southern political elites, particularly given the context of administrative
inexperience, weak economic resources, and interethnic strife (Iyob & Khadiagala, 2006, p. 86).
Furthermore, although the Addis Ababa arrangements allowed Southerners to govern themselves
for the first time, unfortunately the High Executive Council (HEC) brought to the forefront the
rivalries that had characterized Southern politics over the years. As the initial semblance of unity
dissipated, the Southern political elite embarked on the path of political mobilization along
ethnic, sectional, and regional lines (Iyob & Khadiagala, 2006, p. 86). In his interview on South
Sudan TV, Joseph Lago recalled that Numayri took advantage of the South Sudanese politicians’
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weaknesses and transformed the HEC into a sub-system of his presidency. He was able to
dismiss sitting leaders and appoint new ones at will (Lago, 2019).
From 1972 to 1983, Southern politics revolved around the personalities and ethnic
identities of Joseph Lago, an Equatoirian and Abel Alier, a Dinka from the Bor section. This
factionalism and disunity among the Southerners gave the Northern Sudanese officers the ability
to gradually increase control over the southern troops. More provocative still were the orders for
the redeployment of Southern units to the North, which increased significantly in the early
1980s. LeRiche and Arnold said these orders began provoking mutinies in the Southern
Command, culminating in the May 1983 second mutiny (LeRiche & Arnold, 2013, p.30).
Aggravating these tensions, during the late 1970s Numayri used his presidential powers
to undermine the Agreement’s core principles and he effectively abrogated it in June 1983
(Wakoson, 1990) through a re-division of the South. In so doing, he broke Southern Sudan into
three smaller regions, each having its capital, thereby undermining a distinct Southern entity
(LeRiche & Arnold, 2013, p. 30). However, many Southern Sudanese, particularly in the
Equatorian area, supported the re-division policy as a method to acquire greater control in the
face of growing Dinka dominance and their moving into Juba and other Equatorian areas
(LeRiche & Arnold, 2013, p. 30).
The failure of the Addis Ababa Agreement was extraordinarily disillusioning, leading to
severe ramifications and unfavourable consequences. Although initially, as LeRiche and Arnold
argued, the Agreement had been widely supported in the South, over time it failed to
significantly improve Southerners’ quality of life, which deepened resentments over security and
political struggles. This resulted in public dissatisfaction, suspicion and a gradual rejection of the
political situation the Agreement had created; southerners were left with a profound contempt for
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what was seen as ‘false unity.’ Most would later come to doubt that such unity, however it might
be reformed, would be more acceptable than complete independence (LeRiche & Arnold, 2013,
p. 30). Southerners viewed the relatively quick acceptance of the Agreement, without explicit
guarantees of a Southern army and robust international monitoring, as a grave mistake (Koul &
Logan, 2019).
Public outrage began to build, and resentments were especially pronounced among
Anyanya veterans who in the late 1970s started returning to their prior bush war, hoping to
secure South Sudan’s absolute separation from the North. Hence, they formed an armed group
and called themselves Anyany II, with the aim of resurrecting the Southern struggle for
independence, and a second Sudanese civil war was underway (LeRiche & Arnold, 2013, p. 31).
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Chapter Four
“The Path to Southern Independence and a Second Civil War”
The Second Civil War (SPLA/M) 1983 to 2005
The combination of ethnic complexities and negative colonial policies had impacted the growth
of a unified Sudanese Nation-state and positioned it to exist in a continuous condition of
intrastate conflict. In addition, Sharif Harir and Terje Tvedt wrote in Short-Cut to Decay, that in
southern Sudan, where ethnic groups as social categories (tribes) were more important than
social class, one of the main problems in building a “unified identity” had been ethnic arithmetic;
the difficulties in implementing universalistic principles of public policy in the context of
persistent ethnic rivalry and conflict (Harir & Tvedt, 1994, p. 47).
This chapter examines the causes of Sudan’s second civil war, and the way in which it
was fought (both contenders manipulating it to amplify the friction between ethnicities) causing
more conflicts. It will conclude by delving into the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement
(CPA), shedding light on its provisions and how it led to Southern self-determination and
ultimately to South Sudan’s secession and independence. In so doing, it also assesses the
prospects of Sudanese unity envisioned under the banner of a “New Sudan” offered by Dr. John
Garang.1
Events Leading to the Second Civil War (SPLA/M)
Since its independence in 1956, the Republic of Sudan has been in a state of civil war more often
than not. These civil wars had drained economic resources as well as impeding and stopping
infrastructural and human development. Many factors have been identified as the leading causes
of these recurring civil wars. The chapter will argue that the second civil war (which the
50

SPLA/M initiated in 1983), resulted from what Azar termed Protracted Social Conflict -- a builtin conflict mechanism that would keep the country in a loop of social conflict and constant civil
wars. As reviewed in Chapter 1, Azar argued that disputes associated with communal identity
and fear of marginalization or loss of collective integrity produce an enduring antagonistic set of
perceptions and behaviours (Azar, 1990, p. 15). Apart from the strategies and organizational
capabilities of state and communal actors, he concluded that the history of experiences in the
conflicts and other interactions among hostile contestants are also responsible for shaping the
behavioural characteristics of protracted conflict (Azar, 1990, p. 15).
Politically, the Addis Ababa Agreement (AAA) was seen as a ground-breaking solution
to the North/South conflict, to the extent thar Iyob and Khadiagala argued that the agreement was
winning acclaim for Numayri as Sudan’s Abraham Lincoln. However, in reality, as pointed out
in Chapter 3, the AAA had many flaws and loopholes that continued to reflect the profound
national power imbalances inherent in the Sudanese state (Iyob & Khadiagala, 2006, p. 84).
Many factors have been identified by scholars such as Douglas H. Johnson, Andrew S.
Natsios, Mathew LeRiche and Mathew Arnold as causes leading to the second civil war. The
termination of Abel Alier’s government in 1981 indicated the extent of Numayri’s manipulation
and control of the HEC, and was a prelude to his revoking of the entire Addis Ababa Agreement.
The decree Numayri issued dissolving South Sudan’s autonomous government allowed him to
take complete control of the political affairs and governance in the South. He created three new
Southern regions with separate governments and administrations (Equatoria, Bahar al-Gazal and
Upper Nile). In doing so, he had isolated the position of the already weakened South Sudan
political elites; got rid of those who oppose him; and quickly redrew the South Sudan’s map, and
in so doing, moved a significant portion of the oil resources to the North. Numayri’s intent was
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to deprive the Southern government of taking control of their natural resources and controlling
their economy. Indicative of the extent of Southern disunity the Vice President of Sudan and
former leader of the South Sudan Liberation Movement, as well as other politicians from
Equatoria and parts of Bahar al-Gaszal province, who desired more decentralization, supported
Numayri’s decree, which proclaimed the annulment of the autonomous status of South Sudan
Government (Iyob & Khadiagala, 2006, p. 88). In his book Sudan, South Sudan and Darfur,
Natsios attributed the proceeding factor to unresolved border demarcation controversies that
threatened peace following the Addis Ababa Agreement (Natsios, 2012, p. 59). The order to
deploy Battalion 105 stationed in Bor to the North was a clear indication by Numayri that he
intended to undermine that key provision of the AAA. That order was rejected by the
Commander of the garrison Kerubino Kuanyin Bol, who instead moved the Battalion to
Ethiopia, where it joined with others to form the SPLA/M on May 16th, 1983.
Numayri’s 1983 abrogation of the Addis Ababa Agreement added more fuel to what was
an already tense situation. Prior to the abrogation, he had eliminated his “Revolutionary
Partners” and replaced them with Muslim fundamentalists. And now, with the support of his new
political allies (the Islamic Front of Hassan Alturabi), he declared Sudan to be an Arab-Islamic
State (Natsios, 2012, p. 69). Southern Sudanese and other marginalized citizens rejected this
declaration and considered it reason enough to pick up guns and rebel against it (Lesch, 1998, p.
21). It is worth mentioning that Anyanya-2 did not score or achieve any victories in their
skirmishes against Sudan’s two governments. They were not recognized or welcomed by the
Ethiopian Government (which was a close ally of Southern Sudan ), because Anyanya-2’s
objective was total separation of the South from Sudan. In any case, the movement did not
prevail over an extended period. It was overtaken by SPLA/M, which had more assertive leaders,
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with more vigorous objectives that gained them support nationally, regionally and internationally
(See Dhurgon, 1995; Johnson, 2003; and Lago, 2019). Although they did not achieve their
objectives, history will record Anyanya-2 as a group that kept the revolutionary fire blazing in
South Sudan , to be carried on by SPLA/M.
Sought After Objectives of the Civil War
Numayri’s declaration of Sudan as an Arab-Islamic state laid bare the acute tension between the
proponents of the Arab-Islamic paradigm that had dominated political life in the North since
independence and the advocates of “territorial nationalism,” who sought to restructure the
political system to respect minority rights and create a common political identity. In her book
Sudan: Contested National Identity, Lesch acknowledged that the Arab communities in Sudan
see themselves as first-class citizens; and that anybody else who does not fit or succumb to this
principle is viewed as second class citizens (Lesch, 1998; see also Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Lago,
2019 & Dhurgon, 1995). To further inflame the situation, the ruling ethnic nationalists
maintained that the majority religion (Islam) and the widespread language (Arabic) should
define the country’s identity and be expressed in its legal and political system – in short, the
country would become Muslim and Arab in identity (Lesch, 1998, p. 21).
Anyanya-2 and Southern Soldiers 1980 – 1983
Although Addis Ababa Agreement had silenced the guns in Sudan and South Sudan, it did not
completely solve contentious political problems, nor did it fulfill South Sudanese aspirations and
expectations (LeRiche & Arnold, 2013). Instead, it created a new insurgency group composed of
opponents to the Addis Ababa Agreement and disgruntled Anyanya-1 soldiers who were not
happy with the positions or ranks they were given during the absorption process. They were
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joined by other politicians who had remained outside the country because of their low opinion of
the Agreement; leaders like Gordon Mortata and Beshir Bandi.
In one of his speeches, Dr. John Garang had pointed out that the absence of an agreed
upon collective philosophy and unity among the Anyanya-1 revolutionaries might pose a
problem in the future (SPLA, 1985). The split among Anyanya-1 combatants was strong, with
some even willing to fight their former comrades in the arms, who refused to endorse the
agreement. In spite of this, the AAA was signed, and the SRG was formed. But years later, when
Numayri changed gears from being accommodating to assimilating, his guarantee of the Addis
Ababa Agreement began to die out. This caused his supporters from the Anyanya-1 guerrilla
group to lose the motivation to fight on the government side; and those who had always been
skeptical of the agreement confirmed their skepticism (Johnson, 2003, p. 60). Anyanya-2 was
established based on that principle “What is not cooked correctly must go back to fire”. (Johnson,
2003, p. 60).
Both South Sudan’s autonomous government and the central government in the North
considered Anyanya-2 guerrilla fighters to bandits and outlaws. In 1980 and 1981, Johnson
confirmed that local people were confused by the guerrillas’ behaviour and were apprehensive
about their future. However, that confusion began to change as confrontations between the
regional and central government became more frequent and critical (Johnson, 2003, p. 60).
Problems in the relationship between the governments in the North and South -- (particularly
disputes over the placement of the border), -- worked to the benefit of the guerrillas. In 1980 it
allowed some guerrillas to move into the Bentiu district, announcing they had come to protect
the oil fields from the Northern government intrusion.
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During this time, the Northern government became concerned over guerrilla activities in
the South and the positive response they were getting from South Sudanese citizens (Johnson,
2003, p. 61). To prepare for the eventuality of another mutiny or rebellion by Southern troops,
the central government increased the number of Northern soldiers sent to the South. The
Northern soldiers started committing atrocities against the civilians, killing anyone who was
accused of collaborating with guerrillas, raping girls and women, and on many occasions looting
the civilian properties, actions not endearing them to the local population.
From 1981 to 1982, the guerrillas initiated direct talks with the police and some military,
explaining that their quarrel was not with them but with the North. By 1982 (as Johnson noted in
his book), more positive contacts were made with Army officers by one of the most influential
guerrilla leaders operating from Ethiopia, Akuot Atem. Atem, a ‘Dinka’ from Bor district,
maintained personal contact with three former Anyanya-1 officers, namely Colonel John Garang,
retired Major General William Abdallah Choul and Samuel Gai Tut. Another serving exAnyanya-1 officer Major Kerubino Kuanyin Bol, who has been actively fighting Anyanya-2 in
Jonglei Province, was in direct contact with Akuot Atem and the other three officers. Johnson
concluded that throughout April and May 1983, more and more police and soldiers deserted their
units and headed for the bush to join the guerrillas. It needed only the Khartoum government’s
actions to push all of these groups together into an active anti-Northern alliance (Johnson, 2003,
p. 61). Therefore, this paper argues that, even if Anyany-2 did not independently lead the way to
Southern Sudan’s independence, it did in an important way, pave the road for SPLA/M to
takeover leadership in the Second Civil War.
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Mutinies of 1983 and the Foundation of SPLA
As stated by Ruth Iyob and Gilbert M. Khadiagala in their book Sudan: The Elusive Quest for
Peace, the SPLA/M arose from a convergence of many events, key of which was the inadequate
implementation of the Addis Ababa Agreement. Particularly, the slow absorption of the former
Anyanya-1 soldiers into the national army, combined with frustration among the absorbed units
over non- payment of salaries and lack of facilities and proper training, created resentment
among the southern military companies that occasionally erupted in mutinies (Iyob &
Khadiagala, 2006, p. 88). When soldiers of Army Battalion 105 refused the order to move North
in January of 1983, Johnson argued that the soldiers did so partly on the basis of their
interpretation of the Addis Ababa Agreement --- that they were to only serve in South Sudan
(Johnson, 2003; Lago, 2019 and Harir & Tvedt, 1994).
Several South Sudanese politicians attempted to intervene and quiet the situation, people
like Dhol Acuil, the former Vice President of HEC, but he was arrested in Khartoum for
opposing the division of South Sudan. Also, as noted by Johnson, Dr. John Garang when he was
then Head of the Staff College in Omdurman, went to Bor, apparently to mediate. However, as
noted by Joseph Lago in his TV interview, Garang was already party to the conspiracy among a
number of officers in the Southern Command who had been planning the defection of Battalion
105 to the guerillas (Johnson, 2003, p. 61). Garang took advantage of the government’s offensive
against Battalion 105 to lead the mutineers into Ethiopia to join the Anyany-2 rebels, marking
what many see as the beginning of Sudan’s Second Civil War (Iyob & Khadiagala, 2006, p. 88).
In July 1983, the SPLM announced in their first manifesto, indicating that their sought
after objective was the establishment a “New Sudan” based on social, economic and political
equality. Importantly, in so doing they renounced the separatist agenda promoted by some of the

56

Anyanya-2 forces. Johnson, Iyob and Khadiagala and other scholars were of the view that the
SPLM under Garang highlighted the importance of a “national context” wherein all Sudanese
would be free to develop and express their cultures (Iyob & Khadiagala, 2006, p. 89).
Furthermore, the SPLM pointed out that the South did not stand alone. It shared common
grievances with the West and East of Sudan, and that successive Northern governments had
dismissed these grievances by seeking to construct a Sudanese Identity based on the Arabic
culture and Islamic religion (Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006, p.89).
The North employed “tribal militias” to aid in its fight with the South
Iyob and Khadiagala described “the wars in the South and currently the West ... [as] ... racial,
ethnonational, and religious” (2006, p.65). Looking at the identity of the numerous groups
confronting one another in these wars reveals that Sudanese, like other people, forge their
alliances not exclusively on prehistoric ties of kinship and religion, but also on coherent
calculations of economic wellbeing and maximal utilization of available resources (Iyob &
Khadiagala, 2006, p. 65). Likewise, in South Sudan, it is important to note that despite the
conventional belief that all Southerners are united against the Arab-Islamic government in
Khartoum, that statement does not reveal the whole truth. Some desperate Southern communities
were aligned with the Northern government in opposition to the freedom fighters of SPLA/M,
who claimed to represent not only people of the South, but also all the people of Sudan
marginalized by the oppressive Khartoum Government (Iyob & Khadiagala, 2006, p. 65).
Much of the fighting in Sudan’s Second Civil War has been described by external
spectators in tribal terms; as Johnson stated, the SPLA was labelled a Dinka army. This meant
the tribal opposition was not only against the SPLA, but agaisnt Dinka ethnic groups more
broadly (Johnson, 2003, p. 67). It is worth mentioning here that anti-Dinka politics had
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motivated many people in the Equatoria leadership; Johnson recalled that both Lago and
Tumbura were among them. Both leaders had supported the central government in its 1983
attack on Bor; they were very comfortable with the action and commended it as a means of
“Downsizing the Dinka Population.” This negative sentiment against the Dinka and Nuer ethnic
groups had encouraged the central government in Khartoum (and the regional government in
Juba) to manipulate ethnic conflicts in their fight with SPLA.
After the attacks on Bor, Taposa, and Murle, virtually all Dinka Bor men had left to join the
rebeel movement and the only ones left behind were women, children and cattle. Johnson
reported that the government organized a long-range raid and attacked Junglei, killing women,
children, elderly and looting Dinka cattle and other live stock. The Dinka had arranged for their
defence (supported by the few remaining in the Junglei province police) and repulsed the attack.
The bodies of uniformed Toposa police officers were found among the dead, leading to
suspicions that the raids against the Dinka Bor civilians had a political motive and was supported
by the Equatorian Region government (Johnson, 2003, p. 69). It is argued that the Mundari, who
are the closest neighbours to Dinka Bor, were armed by the Regional government under the
pretext of defending themselves from SPLA. The national government in Khartoum was also
directly involved in supplying arms to the Murtle around Pibor for raids against the Dinka and
Nuer, from whom the SPLA drew their support.
Furthermore, Johnson stressed that the government strategy of arming tribal militia in the
South began under Numayri and was continued under all successive Khartoum governments. Its
aims were two-fold -- as propaganda, arguing that the South Sudan war was a product of internal
southern tribalism, and therefore unrelated to national policies, and as a way of waging war
through surrogates. It enabled successive Khartoum regimes , and even some of their
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international allies, to deny the reality of a civil war in Sudan (Johnson, 2003, p. 69). To
conclude his argument, Johnson elaborated on the use of the tribal militia and how the practice
became a significant factor in the war in the years after Jaafar Numayri. 2 The Misiriyya and
Rizaiqat Baqqara, Murahalin (Militia) of Kordufan and Darfur especially received such support
and large well-armed raiding parties of 500 to 1000 men began chasing Dinka Ngok of Abyei
into Northern Bahar al-Gazal, where the Abiem Malual and Twic Dinka also came under attack
(Johnson, 2003, p. 82). Needless to say, such manipulation of ethnicity added real life experience
to elements of distrust that had been imbedded in centuries of tribal interaction and unfortunately
carried over to post-independence political interactions.
Consequences of the Second Civil War
Since its independence in 1956, the Republic of Sudan had been involved in civil wars longer
than it had been in peace. The Addis Ababa Agreement, ground-breaking as it was in ending the
first civil war, ultimately failed in its implementation, leading to yet another. And the second
civil war was even more devastating than the first. Bluntly speaking, however, there has never
been a winner in civil wars. Losses in human and physical infrastructure are always massive, and
it takes years to rebuild and restore what has been destroyed. Sudan’s second civil war (as was
the case in the first), was fought primarily in the South, and there were tremendous losses in
civilian life, estimated at 1.3 million (cited in Sidahmed and Soderlund, 2008, p. 84) and physical
infrastructure.
According to Andrew S. Natsios, human losses could be attributed not only to direct
death due to combat, but due to famine and war- linked causes such as decease; natural causes
such as droughts also contributed to the death toll. Regarding the pattern of fatalities in the
second civil war, Natsios argued that the great famine of 1988-1989 was the most visible
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humanitarian crisis of that civil War; but it was not the only one. Another regional famine caused
by the war took place between 1998 and 1999 -- that famine had killed between 50,000 and
100,000 people (Natsios, 2012, p.77). Natsios further added that the brutal implementation of the
four pillars of Sadiq’s strategy led to most of these deaths. Sadiq’s, and later Omar Beshir’s,
government used displacement, disease and starvation as weapons of war to kill off the Southern
population because they provided the support base for Garang’s Army. In the 1990s, when the
rebellion spread to the Nuba Mountains in Southern Kordufan, Khartoum’s tactics led to the
death of between 60,000 to 70,000 people, according to author Julie Flint’s estimates (see
Natsios, 2012, p. 77). Natsios further cited the American demographer J. Millard Burr, who
reported that 1.3 Million Southerners died in the second civil war, most of them civilians
(Natsios, 2012, p.78). According to a subsequent study, more than a million people perished
between 1993 and 2003. With respect to physical infrastructure, aside from the schools and
hospitals that General Ibrahim Abboud built in the early 1960s, there was little to begin with,
there was significant destruction. It is worth mentioning that early on most of the clashes
between SPLA and SAF were carried in the bush or the countryside. It was not until the late
1990s that Garang changed his tactics and began capturing towns where SAF forces located.
The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005
The Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed on January 9th 2005, between the Republic of
Sudan and the Sudan People Liberation Movement, was a historical event for the Republic of
Sudan and the people of South Sudan. The agreement was signed in six protocols: The
Machakos Protocol, the Power Sharing Protocol, the Wealth Sharing Protocol, the Resolution of
Abyei Conflict Protocol, the Resolution of the Conflict in the Two States of Southern Kordufan
and the Blue Nile Protocol and the Security Arrangement Protocol. The two sides in the
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agreement had faced relentless pressure from the international community to come to an
agreement-- in some instances carrot-language was used and in others stick language was
resorted to. But finally, the documents were signed, and a peace agreement was declared on
January 9th 2005. Unlike the previous AAA, the CPA was facilitated by many countries and
organizations. Negotiations were held in Machakos, Kenya, under the supervision of the
International Authority on Development (IGAD) and the AU and was guaranteed
implementation by the United States, Norway, the UK, and the international community. In their
comments about the CPA, Andrew S. Natsios hailed the agreement and affirmed that peace
would prevail if the Agreement was implemented in letter and spirit (Natsios, 2012).
Dividends of the CPA
Orphaned by the death of Dr. John Garang, the CPA beavered its way slowly but surely through
many obstacles and hurdles. After the passing of Garang, the champion of a “New Sudan,”
supporters of separation abandoned his objectives and vision of the “New Secular Sudan.”
Instead, they worked hard to promote their agenda of partitioning the country, denying the noble
call for unification which Garang fought for, and died believing in. The most implemented
protocol was the one on power-sharing, which provided South Sudan six years of Transitional
Government that would operate with the support of Khartoum Central Government and the
international community. The Transitional Government was to maintain security, make the unity
of Sudan attractive, and improve South Sudan’s living standard by rebuilding the infrastructure
and providing basic needs (see Fadel). Most important of its dividends, the CPA granted South
Sudanese the “Right for Self-determination” to be decided in a referendum which was to be held
in 2010. The results of that referendum were that South Sudanese voted 98% for the session of
South Sudan from the North and the establishment of an Impendent Republic of South Sudan.
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Notes
1. John Garang sought to unify all Sudanese in a united secular Sudan, which would have
created a Sudan that believed in unity, equality, democracy, and one identity. But that
dream was short-lived -- ended by Garang’s death in 2005.
John Young, in his book The Fate of Sudan noted that when Dr. Garang returned from
the USA in 1981, fearing his presence in the South, Numayri posted him to the Army
General Headquarters in Khartoum with the rank of Colonel, which turned out to be
costly mistake. The posting proved an ideal location for plotting, and Garang became
head of the Anyanya-1 group, which was absorbed into Sudan’s Armed Forces ( SAF)
(Young, 2012).
2. The use of tribal militias to Khartoum’s wars was not limited to the South. Note the use
of the notorious “janajweed militias” in the Darfur conflict (Sidahmed, et al., 2008).
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Chapter Five
“Life Experiences in Creating and Maintaining Isolated Identities.”
This chapter will discuss the roles of various “Socialization Agents” in creating and maintaining
what I have termed “Isolated Identity Groups” in South Sudan -- a prime factor underlying an
unparalleled record of civil strife. The discussion is based mainly on the author’s personal
experiences growing up and living in South Sudan from 1959 to 1984 – twenty-five formative
years that saw conflict, peace and a return to civil war.
Socialization is found in all communal interactions, such as in families, schools, political
parties and social groupings – collectively, these are referred to as socialization agents. While
socialization begins within the family unit, Frances M. Deng has pointed out that society in
Southern Sudan is fragmented, composed of many tribes -- 64 in number (Deng, 1995, p. 185),
and we argue that these tribes are central to the region’s socialization process. Each tribal group
observes different cultural norms, religious beliefs, and traditions. Moreover, historically, no one
identity group (North or South) has been able to unify South Sudanese society to establish a
“national identity.” In fact, except for geographical proximity, it was “others” who identified
peoples in the region as “South Sudanese.” Thus, even to address a people as “South Sudanese”
created a false sense of identity because imbedded in that generalization were many isolated and
different ethnic groups, each with its own ethnic identity.
In South Sudan, it has been pointed out that it does not take just one family to raise a child
-- instead, it takes a whole community. And that community, without a doubt, is composed mainly
of people of the same ethnicity (tribe). Hence both family and tribe play complementary roles in
imparting cultural norms to a given individual as he or she grows up and walks proudly with the
identity given to him or her.
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The Family
The family plays an integral role in an individual’s upbringing by teaching values, traditions,
customs and culture. Growing as a young ‘Monyjang’ (male child), I learned 85 to 90 percent of
my social skills from my father when going with him to the farm, hunting or fishing. The rest of
the 10 to 15 percent can be attributed to the tribe’s behaviour, and “agemates” (peer group friends)- experiences learned outside the home. My father and his younger brother (my uncle), when going
hunting, always asked me to carry their spears. The number of the spears usually ran between five
to ten, depending on what animal we wanted to bring home -- an antelope, a gazelle, or a deer. I
found holding the spears to be something amazing and unique, especially when walking in the
bush. It helped build my confidence to become a breadwinner (bringing meat home at the end of
the day) or to be a family protector in case of an attack from enemies. My father and uncle taught
me how to walk like a warrior, act like a warrior and be a great hunter. The time I enjoyed most
was after the supper meal, when all the family members, including my grandfather and
grandmother, would sit around the fire. My grandmother would tell us stories about the ‘Dinka’
tribe and how great warriors they were. Then my grandfather would dispute her, saying, “We are
not ‘Dinka’ - that is not the name God gave us. The Turks are the ones who named us ‘Dinka,’ but
the real name God gave us was “Monyjang” (Mony = Husband or a Man – Jang” = People” (including the non-Dinka).
Many of my contemporaries did not make it to school. I was fortunate because my father
worked for the ministry of Civil Infrastructural Engineering under the central government in
Khartoum. He was transferred to Malakal, where I started my elementary and secondary school
education. At age six and a half, I was able to see Arab merchants and Arabs kids for the first time.
Because we lived at the same compound, they became my friends. Even though we played
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together, I always received a lecture from my parents and my uncle when I get back home about
how I must not forget I am “Monyjang.” I have to be careful when I am playing with Arabs kids
because they abduct our kids and sell them into slavery. My friendship with these Arab kids did
not go particularly well. There were language differences; I only spoke Dinka, and they only knew
the Arabic Language. So we played together, but with few words, inferior communications
sometimes led to misunderstandings and anger.
Tribal Culture
Sixty-four ethnics groups inhabit South Sudan. Each group has their unique cultural norms and
traditional process to bring up their children. Nuer and Shilluk, for example, raise their children
similarly to the Dinka and other Nilotic tribes who are cattle keepers. There are minor differences
that emerge when the children of this Nilo group reach adolescence and early manhood. The
difference is how they mark their children's forehead with the unique markings that make each
ethnic group identifiable. These marks vary in shape and size. The Nuer and Dinka Agar, for
example, cut rounded lines on their forehead, the Dinka cut eight of these lines, and the Nuer cut
six lines, depending on their subsection of the Nuer ethnic group. The marks of the Shilluk are cut
in a dotted shape. Cut along the forehead, sometimes reaching twelve dots or more, depending on
the subsection of the Shilluk ethnic group. The Nilotic and some Bantus of South Sudan are easily
noticeable by their marks on the forehead, or the number of teeth intentionally pulled out.
The tribal fragmentation characteristic of South Sudan is based on natural land features and
economic activities that have influenced patterns of traditional settlement and social organization
pre-dating colonization. Some of these tribes had been given names, reflecting a broader sense of
identity than characteristic of peoples who were loosely connected in cultural terms but otherwise
not organized as different groups. Deng argued that Southern Sudanese culture’s most striking
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feature is the extent to which the cattle economy dominated the lives of Nilotic people, who are
numerically the most dominant groups in the region. As Deng pointed out, the day-to-day lives of
the Dinka and Nuer peoples are intensely connected to the “cow economy” -- the animal being a
veritable god. In addition, both the Dinka and Nuer peoples are incredibly conservative and very
proud of their civilizations.
Personally, growing up as a Dinka “city boy,” one had to balance one’s lifestyle between
the city (where the immediate family members lived) and the cattle camp (where the culture, values
and traditions of a Dinka young person were meticulously taught). This voyage to the cattle camp
is a compulsory part of growing up, and it happens once schools are closed for the summer leave
or during the dry season when the cattle are brought closer to permanent dwelling areas. In the
cattle camps, the government played a limited role because within the ethnic group, disputes were
rare, and if they happened, they were resolved by elders. Chiefs and veterinary officials were the
most visible government representatives known to the group at the cattle camp. Cattle camp groups
were divided based on their age and gender, and children developed a sense of belonging that
remained intact through their lifetimes. Even when one moved to the city (or elsewhere, nationally
or internationally), he or she would still remember and be remembered by the name given to their
group during the process of attaining “manhood or womanhood.”
Unlike a child brought up in South Sudan, children raised in communities in the North
(those specifically in Arab and Islamic areas) were brought up based on Arabic and Islamic values.
The central government in the North participated directly in teaching these values through the
schools, national media (radio and television) by airing Islamic programs and reading verses of
the Qur’an at prayer times. The Mosques in northern Sudan also played an influential role in the
community that impacted the upbringing of Northern children. In general, it takes a family and an
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ethnic community to raise a child in South Sudan. However, in the North, it takes a family, a
Muslim community, and the government to teach cultures and educate children,
The Central Government and the Resolution of Tribal Conflicts
Government intervention in simple intra-ethnic conflicts is not needed. As John Wuol Makac
mentioned in his book The Customary Law of the Dinka People of Sudan, the tribes of South Sudan
(the Nilotic tribes in particular) do not rely on the government to solve their internal problems
(Makac, 1988, p. 17). Each tribe has their chiefs or kings. The Azande tribes of Western Bahar alGazal had a king (whose position now is symbolic), but he presides over tribal courts; his position
is maintined by the Ministry of Local Government and Law Enforcement of Western Bahar alGazal State. The same prevails with Shilluk King or the “Reith” These individuals represent the
higher authority within the ethnic group. Johnson noted that the judicial power of these chiefs and
kings in South Sudan was confined to certain aspects of customary laws and that the British District
Commissioner supervised their administrative work (Johnson, 2003, p. 12). Should there be a
conflict between what the District Commissioner ordered and what the tribe believed was the
correct policy, there was a question as to which order would be obeyed.
I had the privilege of witnessing the “Gadiang Conflict Resolution Conference” in 1980
between the Dinka Bor, Anyuak and the Mourle Ethnic groups (all in Junglei State) on the one
hand, and the Tapossa of Eastern Equatoria, on the other hand.1 Several issues were on the table,
from child abduction, cattle raiding to border and marriage issues. The order for this conference
was issued by the “High Court” in Juba, South Sudan and facilitated by the Regional Government
of South Sudan (SRG). Government officials were told that their presence was not needed. Dinka
Bor Chief Kual Anyieth stated that government “Judgements” were always biased and influenced
by its relationship to tribes with more people working for the Government. In addition, chiefs from
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other provinces (Equatoria and Bahar al-Gazal) had been invited to help solve the conflict between
the tribes in Upper Nile.
It was my conclusion that the government was often not trusted by the tribes. Orders and
instructions from the government had to be channelled through chiefs or other tribal authorities,
which the Turkiyya and Anglo-Egyptian Condominium did during their Administration of South
Sudan. They set up tribal courts composed of local leaders and gave them full authority to judge
the issues relevant to the ethnic group and fine and jail criminals, including the power to adjudicate
murder cases. John Makac mentioned in his book that most of the murder or killing occurred during
intra-ethnic conflicts. The only time the government became involved in local criminal issues was
when a person was sentenced to jail; because the government was the sole authority controlling
the prisons.
Schools (Christian Missionaries)
Education, in general, was not a priority during the Turko-Egyptian rule in Sudan. As stated earlier,
the Ottoman Empire's interest in Sudan focused on slaves, animal products and other natural
resources. Although the British were keen about educating Sudanese, as Heather J. Skarky stated
in her book Living with Colonialism: Nationalism and Culture in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, as
they did elsewhere, the British relied on Christian Missionary Schools to train young men for
employment. But in the case of Sudan, to avoid offending the Muslim elite, they placed the colonial
government in the North in charge of the type of education they needed to staff their public services
-- clerks, accountants, teachers and engineers. Like institutions elsewhere in Africa—including
Sadigi College in Tunisia, Makerere College in Uganda, Ecole William Ponty in Senegal, and
Fourah Bay College in Sierra Leone -- the British authorities established Gordon College
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(currently the University of Khartoum) in 1902 for that purpose. Gordon College served not only
as a training ground for the bureaucracy but as a cradle of nationalism (Sharky, 2003, p. 7).
As far as South Sudan was concerned, the British believed southern society needed to be
protected from the Muslim North, whose traders had preyed upon the South in the nineteenthcentury slave trade. As outlined in Chapter 3, the British applied isolationist policies (the Closed
Border Ordinance). While they entrusted the colonial government in Khartoum with educational
development in the North, this was not the case in the South, where they gave underfunded
Christian Missionary groups full authority over education. Whether the British education policy in
the South was meant to educate southerners (or keep them entirely in the dark) remains a subject
of discussion among academic scholars.
Johnson and Sharky, in their assessments of the issue of inequality in education, stated that
during the colonial era, in both the North and the South, those to be educated were male. Females
had no place at Gordon College, nor was education providing basic literacy easily accessible to
girls throughout the colonial period (Sharky, 2008, p. 8). Nevertheless, as Johnson pointed out,
educational needs were much more limited in the South. Before WWI, the colonial government in
Khartoum declared that it needed only a few educated blacks to fill minor clerical positions in the
South. The first of these groups came from the sons of soldiers rather than from the local
population. The colonial government invested very little in education in the South, leaving it
entirely in the hands of religious bodies. The result was Khalwas (kindergartens), serving Muslim
urban communities and Christian Missions which operated irregularly in the rural areas and far off
settlements (Johnson, 2003, p. 15). Moreover, as Johnson pointed out, the policy of the Native
Administration adopted in 1920 tended to discourage rather than encourage education in some
areas of Southern Sudan, predominantly rural areas.
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My personal experience as an urban city boy who reached the age of enrolment to primary
school (typically six years old) was complicated. There was no missionary school in Malakal, the
town where I lived; however, a Catholic School accepted younger student and taught them how to
read and write the English Language (no Mathematics was introduced). The other obstacle was
that the school was located in a small village of “Tonja” 21 miles away from Malakai. It was not
a boarding school, and there was no bus.
My father was once again transferred from Malakal to Renk. However, Renk belonged to
the “Padang” section of the Dinka tribe. They were very close to the North, and that created a
mixed culture of Arabic/Dinka, with the Arabic dominant culture. In Renk, there were several
Islamic mosques, but no Christian churches. My father decided to send my uncle, my Mom and I
back to Malakal where I was forced to enter Islamic pre-school for one and half years before I was
admitted into first-year of primary school. Thus, I was enrolled in Islamic school and started from
‘Khalwa,’ where I had to memorize two introductory books to the Quraan [Juzu Aama and Juzu
Tubarak]. Each book took six months to finish. By the time we were done, final exams were
composed of reciting the two books from memory; then, there was dictation in the Arabic
language. These two hurdles had to be passed before one was allowed to enter regular first-year
primary school.
Grading involved a most exciting process. A raffle system was devised whereby a small
piece of paper was rolled up according to the number of the students in the class. That pieces of
paper were then put in a jar. On these papers, they wrote “Pass” or “Fail.” It is worth mentioning
here that there were only two primary schools in Malakal, and there were five Khalwas. Each
Khalwa could bring only fifteen students forward to the first year. We had fifty-three students in
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our Khalwa. It took me two years to move up from the Khalwa because I kept picking “Fail” paper
from the raffle jar.
My father was once again transferred from Malakal to Renk. I would have never been able
to go to school, but luckily, my cousin got married, and her husband had graduated from the “Tonj”
technical school and was transferred to Malakal to work as a clerk in the city council. He took me
to the assistant commissioner of education and demanded that I be enrolled in the government
public school. The number of students whose parents transferred to Malakal in that year 1968 was
thirty-five. After a serious discussion between the Education Commissioner (who happened to be
from the North and the District Commissioner who was also from the North), they decided to open
a “second shift” set of classes for us, starting school after ‘Arabs’ pupils finished at 2:00 pm.
In 1969, I was supposed to be promoted to the second year, but the May revolution led by
General Numayri took place, and as a gift from him to South Sudanese, he opened additional
primary and junior secondary schools in all three provinces of Juba, Malakal and Wau. However,
he attached the condition that these schools must follow the Arabic pattern, meaning all the
subjects must be taught in Arabic, and that Islamic prayer times must be observed. All students
enrolled in those schools were required to pray irrespective of their religious beliefs. Many parents
who were not Muslim removed their kids from school. I, however, remained in the school and was
promoted to junior secondary school. In 1973 my parents moved from Malakal to Tonj in Bahar
al-Gazal province. I finished my senior secondary school at the Renk Senior Secondary there. I
was denied entrance to Khartoum University in 1978 and instead recruited as a tax collector in
1979.
Churches
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Sudan's three religious beliefs are African traditional, Christianity and the dominant religion Islam,
representing 70 percent of the total population. In South Sudan, before secession, Christianity
represented 25 percent of the population. In comparison, African traditional and animist beliefs,
according to Sikianga, Robert O. Collins, Din, & Alshahi, 2021, in their article “Sudan,” a small
percentage (about 5 percent) of the Sudan population follow traditional and animist religion,
mostly in the Nuba Mountains It worth mentioning here that the church in South Sudan has a long
history connected to the Ancient Nubia. The latter, according to John Makac, was the first to bring
Coptic Christianity to South Sudan. During the colonial period, the Anglican church and Catholic
missionaries assigned to the Diocese in Sudan had been granted the right to build cathedrals in all
the three provinces of South Sudan (Makac, 1988, p. 35).
This chapter argues that although Sudan was ruled under the British colonial system, the
British did not attempt to alter or inhibit the popular religion of the masses in the North, which
was Islam. It is to be noted that when the British came to Sudan, they had Egypt as their partners,
and Egypt has one of the largest mosques in the Islamic World, built by Omar Ibn al Aze during
the period of Islamic expansion era after the death of Prophet Muhammed. Peace be upon him.
However, Britain concentrated its efforts to Christianize Southern Sudanese who were not Muslim
but instead followed traditional African religious practices.
Although the “animists” in South Sudan share some common elements of religious beliefs,
at the same time, each ethnic group has its indigenous religion. Virtually all of South Sudan’s
traditional African religions share the concept of a high spirit or divinity, usually a creator God.
According to the Encyclopedia Britannica, the “Earthly” and the “Heavenly” (visible and invisible)
exist as two concepts of the universe. The astral world is seen as being populated by spiritual
beings whose function is to serve as intermediaries or messengers of God. In the case of the Nilotic
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peoples, these spirits are identified with their ancestors. The supreme deity is the object of rituals
using music and dance (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2020).
Peer Groups and Sports Teams
Geography and the nature of South Sudan have effectively impacted the physiological appearance
and body construction of Southern Sudanese, which are considered one determinant of athletic
excellence. The Nilotic (Dinka, Nuer, Shilluk and Lowu) are famous for the high jump, basketball,
volleyball and spear throwing. Bentos and other equatorial ethnics groups are well-known as
sprinters, body-builders, football players (i.e., soccer), boxing, and other martial arts. Most if not
all these skills and athletic abilities are acquired through school and private athletic clubs.
There are many well known football teams in Sudan and South Sudan. The most popular
ones are the Marieke (Planet Mars) and the Hilal (Moon Crescent). These two teams do not have
ethnic borders. Soccer is the only sport that brings all the Sudanese together, irrespective of where
they hailed from or what religion they believed. However, even in football, sometimes politics was
indirectly evoked during football matches, especially between the North and South. Most South
Sudanese cheer for the “Mariekh football team,” a majority of their players are from the East, West
and South Sudan and are mainly “Africans.” The majority of Hilal Football Team players are from
the Central and North Sudan; very few blacks are Muslim.
Southerners dominate in basketball, which is not as popular as football. However, the
national team is controlled by the Ministry of Youth and Sports of both Governments and is
consistently underfunded -- it is appreciated but not loved. Most of my colleagues and school mates
played basketball, but my favourite sports were boxing and weightlifting, and I was able to
represent my school in two tournaments where I brought home “Bronze” in one match in 1977 and
“Gold” in weight-lifting in 1978, the year of my graduation from Senior Secondary School.
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Political Parties (The SPLM)
The Sudan People Liberation Movement is the only civilian-military party that has adopted the
establishment of a unified secular Sudan as its goal, a strategy that its founders claimed would
address all the matters of nationalism and develop Sudan's multicultural identity. As Joseph Lago
articulated in his interview, this strategy had gained SPLM sympathy and support from many
Sudanese citizens. However, and most importantly, it could have unified most of the sixty-four
ethnic groups of South Sudan after a long time in disagreements and self-centredness.
Iyob and Khadiagala, in their book Sudan: The Elusive Quest for Peace, argued that there
was a series of political fractures that characterized radical southern Sudanese political movements
before SPLM/A achieved success in its military campaign. In July 1967, Aggrey Jaden founded
the Southern Sudan Provincial Government (SSPG). A rival group, the Nile Provisional
Government (NPG), was formed in 1969 to oppose Jaden (SSPG) (Iyob & Khadiagala, 2006, p.
82). Yet another faction formed, the Anyidi Revolutionary Government in July of 1969,
presumably to provide more military muscle and organization to the rebellion. In addition, there
was dissatisfaction within the leadership of the Anyanya (Iyob & Khadiagala, 2006, p. 821).
Within Bahar al-Gazal and Upper Nile, there were the Southern Sudanese Political Association
(SSPA), the Sudan African Congress (SAC, and Sudan African National Union (SANU). There
was a fourth party in Upper Nile, the Sudanese People Federal Party (SPFP), and all the above and
other parties were dissatisfied with the leadership of the Anyanya (Iyob & Khadiagala, 2006, p.
821). To strengthen his position and exercise more control. Joseph Lago formed a breakaway
faction, The Anyanya National Organization (ANO). It should be noted that Iyob and Khadiagala
argued that in-fighting among the Southern rebel movements predicted the split within SPLA/M
that was witnessed in the late 1980s and 1990s. In short, the conflict that developed among South
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Sudan’s political elite post-2011 should not have come as a surprise – there was ample warning
that South Sudanese politics was fractious.
However, after the Addis Ababa Agreement and the formation of SRG, most of the political
parties in Sudan and South Sudan became redundant. Numayri’s establishment of the Sudan
Socialist Union (SSU) had eclipsed all the political parties, forcing other leaders to flee the country.
Currently, there are over 27 political parties in South Sudan. Out of this number, only 15 parties
are registered, but some are categorized as defunct. Salva Kiir leads the SPLM mainstream;
SPLM/IO, SPLM/DC, SPLM/FM are the main parties in the new revitalized Government of
National Unity in South Sudan.
Mass Media
South Sudan’s Mass Media is underdeveloped. The issues of technical know-how, poor
transportation, corruption, and mismanagement are all factors that impede the progress of mass
media in the country. Although the government has an impressive set of media outlets, ranging
from radio, television, newspapers to news agencies and the internet, they are still lagging in
service delivery.
A few years ago, South Sudan was able to acquire a channel on the “Arabsat” satellite.
With satellite technology being available and accessible, the country could air daily news and other
programs such as children’s shows, religious and arts programs that could promote the idea of
“unity as one nation and one people.” Recently, the Khartoum government, after mediating the
South-South conflict, offered to lend the South Sudan Broadcasting Commission (SSBC) technical
assistance to improve its service delivery.
It is worth mentioning here that the availability of the satellite has helped tremendously in
the development of networks and telephone services. It has also attracted many telephone
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companies such as Zein, Sudatel and others to invest in South Sudan telephone services. With the
development of these modern communications and technological services, South Sudan will not
forever remain an isolated island in an ocean of ignorance and neglect. It is no longer a myth that
the world has become a small village and that the vehicle to that simplicity was the development
of social media, such as the internet, facebook and youTube. In South Sudan today, a pastoralist
who has never seen a mobile phone aside from a motorola satellite phone can sell one of his or her
cows, purchase a 3G Samsung or iPhone handset and communicate with relatives on the other side
the world. As is widely known, communication is power, and with the power of mass media in
hand, it is easy to circulate any new information at a minute’s notice. Events like political unrest,
tribal conflicts and other crimes against helpless nations worldwide can no longer be hidden. These
events now could effortlessly and publicly be announced, which would alert the international
community to quickly intervene and abate catastrophes such as famine, flood, or genocide.
Entertainment (Popular Music)
Sudan was once Africa’s largest country and was inhabited by over 500 different ethnic groups.
Within these ethnic groups were embedded a mosaic of Arabic and African cultures, which makes
it challenging to tell where one culture ends and the other one begins. When Sudan and South
Sudan were still one country, many areas such as music, cultural dance, and even some lyrics and
poetry caused many controversies and disagreements because of the Islamic orientation of the
state. Government laws and restrictions complicated the relationship between the government and
the entertainment industries.
Still, music festivals were being held, attended by many spectators and music lovers. Many
well-known musicians, such as Muhammed Wardi, Salah Ibn Albadia, Alkably and Abu Araki
Albakhiet, gained fame -- the list is very long (Editorial, World Music Network, 2014). It is worth
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mentioning that some of these patriotic performers, songs writers and singers paid the ultimate
price with their lives, some were jailed, and others fled the country. But the spirit of music was
never defeated. Nor was the Government able to eliminate popular culture because people are
culture, and culture is life.
Before the secession of the South, as stated earlier, one could not draw a line between
music influenced by Afrobeats or Arabic Sudanic style. Many locally made musical instruments
were popular in both North and South Sudan, for example, “Tamhour,” which is a type of ‘Lyre.’
Also, the “Lude” is very popular in Northern Sudan, played by Northern Ethnic groups, as well as
the Bagarra in Western Sudan. Other instruments such as the violin, various horns and the
accordion were adopted after World War II. The electric guitar arrived in Sudan in the sixties, aw
well as musical influences from Jimmy Hendrix and the jazz legend Santana. The electric keyboard
came in the 1980s (Editorial, World Music Network, 2014), and Sudanese musicians mixed
traditional styles with modern music composing.
In the South, the story was different. At the same time as the war with the SPLA intensified,
the Khartoum government destroyed all the recorded valuable and important Southern cultural
artifacts-- that included wiping out all the tapes of famous musicians of South Sudan -- singers like
James Fataki, Steven Deng Deng, the Dinka Aweil group and many others. Following
independence, South Sudan had to start from scratch to build what the war had destroyed in terms
of arts, music and culture.
The new South Sudanese music generation began the process by introducing all kinds of
music, from classical to pop and highlife music, to reggie and hip hop. “Grandfather” music bands
like Jeel Jaz Band, Rejaff Band, Fashuda Jaz Band, and many others are being revitalized. New
music and new songs are being introduced. The flamboyant mosaic of Arabic and African culture
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is heard on Radio and Television in South Sudan, addressing many social issues, the most
important of which is teaching the lost nation of South Sudan a new meaning of nationhood and
the values of a unified people. Their message is loud and clear “We stood together to liberate our
country, let us stand together again to create a unified identity.” Magok is a young South Sudanese
poet from the “Dinka Agar” ethnic group -- here is one of his songs:
“Cinko bai Ku Dutko Ruot” [“Let us live in the country and unite ourselves”]
Ee pan cuk thor wa kuhk,
Ee pan cuk lweil ni rimkua
Achie pan cathor ni akuhk
En e beir cuar piny hu waj ni achouk
Palku tong Ku rerku, ecin nuer, ju cin shiluk

Translation of Lyrics:
It is the country; with our arms, we fought for it
We paid our blood as a ransom for our freedom
Is this not the land you fought for and get it
Now you throw it down, and with your feet, you kick it
Let us castoff fighting and stay together, with no Nuer, No Shilluk
But one South Sudan, tied down by love
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Conclusion
“Post-Independence Conflict in South Sudan:
A “Lost Vision” and Lack of a Unified Southern Political Identity”
Since its Independence in 1956, the Republic of Sudan has been involved in constant civil wars
that have killed at over a million people, and displaced 4 to 5 million more, crippled the country
economically and developmentally and led to the breakaway of South Sudan. The causes of these
civil wars have been attributed to many factors, which we argue in this paper can be summed up
into “grievance” and “identity” conflicts. As the analysis of Dr. Edward Azar pointed out,
grievances as a result of depriving others of receiving equal government services and wealth
sharing or shared authority, often leads to communal dissatisfaction resulting in civil conflict -and this is clearly the case with respect to Sudan. The political elites and subsequent
governments in the North of the country abandoned their moral responsibility towards South
Sudan and other marginalized areas. They carried on with their selfish, egocentric idea of
“Islamization” and “Arabization” that generated conflict and eventually led to the separation of
South Sudan in 2011.
In addition, due to factors such as geography, isolation and demographics, plus colonial
government (and post-independence Sudanese government) policies which worked to foster
separation and isolation, the South (as a whole), never developed a unified “National Identity” of
its own. Beyond the basic recognition that the South was fundamentally different from and was
treated both unequally and unfairly by the North, a common bond strong enough to bring
together a significant variety of ethnic groups as a “nation” did not develop.
It is important to note that the separation of South Sudan was not the sole idea of people
living in the South; some Northerners as well were not happy with the idea of partitioning the
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country and worked for unification along with those in the South led by John Garang. However,
after the death of Dr. Garang in 2005, opponents of a united secular Sudan worked hard to make
the envisioned “Attractive Unity” that Garang envisioned “Unattractive” (see Fadel 2012). In
addition, differences within the South, based on region, tribe and religion, continued to hinder
the development of a unified Southern identity strong enough to sustain a “national” government.
Added to the aforementioned government policies (under both colonial and independent
governments) reviewed in Chapters 3 and 4, socialization agents (primarily family and tribe) as
discussed in Chapter 5, perpetuated differences both between the South and North and between
tribal groups in the South. Thus neither the “Unity of Sudan,” nor the unity of the new nation of
South Sudan had a bed-rock of attitudinal support in the South.
On the issue of a possible “United Sudan,” in spite of great respect for Dr. John Garang,
as reviewed in Chapter 3, given that that the union of Sudan resulted from a brutal conquest, at
least from the time of the problem-filled Sudanese independence from Britain in 1956, combined
with the arrogation of the Addis Ababa Agreement (which might have saved the idea of unity of
one nation), that outcome has to be seen as a “lost vision” – one that was highly unlikely to be
achieved. But the question remains: Why, after all that had been achieved in the 2005
Comprehensive Peace Agreement, did the new country of South Sudan born in 2011, fail to
emerge from Protracted Social Conflict?
We have argued repeatedly in this paper that it was in the interests of both colonial
regimes and post-independence governments to maintain a fragmented and isolated society in the
South. These policies were successful and had consequences. Indeed, as reported in Chapter 4,
the second civil war was as much a civil war between tribes in the South as it was a war between
the armed forces of the South and North. The manipulation of tribal differences (and Southern
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political leaders) to create intra-South hostilities was very much a part of Northern strategy in the
war – and it worked. South Sudan, as born in 2011, was a textbook example of what New York
Times’ Columnist Thomas Friedman has described as a “Tribes with Flags” type of country
(Friedman, 2011, Mar. 23).
As the central theme of this research paper, we have argued that the multi-ethnicity that
characterized Sudan and the inequality that some groups faced in the distribution of power and
resources were the primary factors leading to the conflict between North and South Sudan. But let
us examine more closely the situation in the South.
Truth be known, as is the case with many other countries in the underdeveloped world that
relied heavily on ethnicity to survive, conflicts between tribes in South Sudan are a fact of life. In
South Sudan’s case, the starting point of the conflict between Dinka and Nuer can be found in
competition for grazing areas and cattle raiding. These conflicts are well-documented in the
historical record. After the separation of the South, the Northern government continued to
manipulate these conflicts and politicized them for their benefit.
Also as argued earlier, single ethnic group hegemony (in this case Dinka), created much
resentment among the tribes who felt disadvantaged, resulting in each group arming itself, with
some declaring war against the government. By doing this, they felt that if a settlement or
agreement was reached (or if a pardon was given to them), they could gain a position of power
within the government. As well, lack of knowledge as to how the newly independent country
would be ruled, exacerbated the situation and caused more chaos. As was the case with the
Southern Regional Government in the 1970s following the Addis Ababa Agreement, disunity
and conflict did not take long to resurface. In what was to turn out to be a dysfunctional national
government, the ruling political elite in the South never really gained control of the situation. An
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election was conducted in the hope that a parliamentary government would resolve a host of
problems. However, following the election, the elected President did not resign his military rank;
that in itself was a recipe for trouble.
Yet another factor that led the young country to plunge into renewed conflict in 2013 was
interference from the North – including the significant military support tribal militia groups
received from the Northern government. Following past practice, the Northern government had
succeeded in destabilizing South Sudan’s government and blocked progress, not only by
supporting rebel groups, but also by infiltrating the Southern government through the (NCP) party
members who were given sensitive positions within the government of South Sudan.
Where do things stand at present? The Republic of South Sudan is now 10 years old. There
are signs of political reform in the North and the old political elite in the South will be passing into
history. Could it be that a new political leadership can emerge in the South that will take seriously
Magok’s advice: “Let us cast off fighting and stay together, with no Nuer, No Shilluk. But one
South Sudan, tied down by love.” We can but hope for this outcome.
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